Relative Verity of Bordeline Sentence

L. A. Кatz

Abstract


The paper represents main ideas of my theory “Relative verity logic” (RVL), that combines advantages of two contrary approaches to vagueness (many-valued theory and supervaluationism). RVL allows the fruitful treatment of borderline cases while saving all the classical tautologies and inference rules; and on top of all this, it also avoids the trap of the sorites paradoxes.

Keywords


vagueness; borderline sentence; relative verity; super valuation

References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.15802/ampr2012/7815

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