ISSN 2227-7242 (Print), ISSN 2304-9685 (Online)

Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень, 2020, Вип. 17

Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research, 2020, NO 17


UDC 130.2+177.3


1*H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine), e-mail, ORCID 0000-0002-7198-9157
2*Cherkasy Institute of Fire Safety named after Chornobyl Heroes of the National University of Civil Protection of Ukraine (Cherkasy, Ukraine), e-mail, ORCID 0000-0002-8898-9743



Purpose. The purpose of the study lies in critical reconstruction of Thomas Hobbes’s social contract theory as an important principle not only of modern political anthropology, but also of modern and postmodern social projects. As well as, in the unfolding of the fundamentally important both for the newest social-philosophical and philosophical-anthropological discourses of the thesis that each individual is the origin of both personal and institutional freedom and justice, making the contract first of all with himself, with his desires and sorrows and then with other people and the state. Theoretical basis. The principle of social contract offered by Hobbes became a new social, methodologically significant and relevant principle of regulation of activity, which indicates essential for the modern political philosophy and the philosophy of law transition from teleological (ancient and medieval) to legal (modern) ideas of justice. For an in-depth study of the philosophical and anthropological aspects of Hobbes’s contractualism, we used the historical-comparative and contextualization method, as well as the works of leading native and foreign researchers of Hobbes, who uphold the provisions on the organic affiliation of fundamental socio-philosophical and philosophical-anthropological questions about the nature of man, the relation of coercion, freedom and justice with the discourse of social contract. Originality. On the basis of a consistent analysis of the anthropological component of Hobbes’s theory of social contract, an in-depth understanding of modern contractualism and contemporary discussions in the field of its existential and anthropological component is offered, as well as the thesis that political anthropology is the core of the philosophical anthropology because it makes possible the methodologically important understanding of the basic problems of human existence – the interaction of justice and freedom, self-interest and public good, as well as it quite clearly outlines the ways to overcome the dilemmas of liberalism and communitarianism, individualism and holism. Conclusions. Political anthropology of T. Hobbes constructed in the context of a modern social project, justified the issue of interaction between freedom and justice, which is fundamentally important to nowadays, through the search for such a way of social relations, in which an individual, being in the realm of social existence, would seek to limit his own selfishness and freedom for the sake of the common will of the majority. Thanks to Hobbes, the idea of external humility in disobedience to the inner, of freedom of conscience as a "human and citizen", of an understanding of individual independence, which is not just a permissible but accepted by state power, has been acquired with exceptional theoretical and practical meaning. Thanks to Hobbes’s works, the essence (and the falsity of simplified interpretations of the latter’s heritage) was revealed by the relationship between the cooperative and the conflicted vision of man.

Keywords: social contract; man; justice; freedom; power; state


Such well-known philosophers as D. Gauthier, O. Höffe, W. Kersting, A. Leist, H. Maier, K. Hubner, C. Taylor, C. Schmitt, M. Weber critically realized and referred to the classical theory of social contract of Thomas Hobbes. The significance of the idea of a social contract for the constitution of a just state of law is noted by Ukrainian researchers as R. Dymerets, O. Khoma, V. Shamray, A. Yermolenko. In philosophical circles, the interest to Hobbes’s understanding of a man, his freedom, power and justice is only increasing, as evidenced, for example, by an international conference at the Department of Political Philosophy at the University of Tübingen, dedicated to the realising of the famous work of Hobbes "De Cive" in March last year.


The purpose of the study lies in critical reconstruction of Thomas Hobbes’ social contract theory as an important principle not only of modern political anthropology, but also of modern and postmodern social projects. As well as, in the unfolding of the fundamentally important both for the newest social-philosophical and philosophical-anthropological discourses thesis that each individual is the origin of both personal and institutional freedom and justice, making the contract first of all with himself, with his desires and sorrows and then with other people and the state.

Statement of basic materials

This is primarily about the methodological significance and urgency for modern philosophy and our inner space of the principle of social contract developed by Hobbes as a new social principle of regulation of human existence, which became the embodiment of the essential for modern political philosophy and the philosophy of the right of transition from the teleological to the legal images of a man, his freedom and justice. It is precisely because of the profound methodological shifts in the understanding of a human nature, as well as its freedom and justice, and almost all known in the sphere of European political philosophy authors’ appeal to the Hobbes’ way of thinking. They emphasize the fact that the break with the natural state means a new social principle of activity’s regulation – when the place of instincts and traditions can be replaced by justice. And the individual, with all his natural rights, agrees with the community only in condition of the presence of such rules that express a general interest. The interpretation of the mentality by T. Hobbes only as a mentality predominantly instrumental, only as rational, substitutes a reasonable compromise of rational individuals within the limits of a particular agreement. This new-day idea of a social contract, embodied primarily in the political philosophy of Rousseau, is concentrated, and was later embodied in the thesis of I. Kant that in the practical questions concerning the justification of norms and actions, the place of profound principles such as nature or God is replaced by a formal principle of mentality.

The investigated by Lou Marinoff influence of T. Hobbes’ ideas on such classics of contractualism as J.-J. Rousseau, J. Locke, and I. Kant, not only made it possible to extrapolate by the author of the article of the Hobbes’ negative interpretation of human nature (humans are selfish predators with instinct wishes) on Freud ideas of overcoming the fear of death and the unknown, but also actualized Hobbes’ political and philosophical anthropology which we are studying. If L. Marinoff (2019) calls modern people as "unlimited maximizers" who strive to get a quick and maximum benefit of every situation whether it is social, economic or political at minimal personal cost, then it is quite logical to supplement T. Hobbes’s "strict portrait of human nature" by reconstructing of his thoughts about freedom and justice.

Before formulating the main "critical" points of Hobbes’s political philosophy, we emphasize that it was the social contract, became for him synonymous to the agreement of individuals about a stable state order that was able to save people from the horrors of the "natural state" with its "a war as is of every man against every man". The tragic picture of the lonely, poor and short human life, inherent in the individual in its "primitive state", a sense of fear and mutual danger, generates, according to Hobbes, the possibility of the agreement of individuals to end the "a war as is of every man against every man" and the achievement of civil peace. As W. Kersting (1996) points out: "absolute domination is not only a sufficient condition, but also a necessary condition for ending the state of war and establishing a peaceful order of coexistence" (p. 100).

The necessity for an overall understanding of the social and political life of a person is also stipulated by the search for ways of mediating the main measurements of regulating the individual’s behaviour in civil society; personal opportunity to agree on a rejection of aggressive behaviour. Mutual interest also gives the possibility of continuation the action, initially, only of a simple peace agreement within the state, where a person is compelled to sacrifice the right and part of freedom, relying on the ability to distinguish between good and evil. However, here appears the problem of the combination of freedom and justice, of personal and general interest, which is an additional argument in favour of a consistent and critical reconstruction of Hobbes’s answer to the question. In other words, how important and fundamental for him and for the further development of modern political philosophy was the negative-conflict interpretation of human nature, their freedom and justice? This is primarily about the work of the famous German philosopher Otfried Höffe. It is worthwhile to highlight Hobbes (Höffe, 2010) as his most significant work, which describes not only the way of life and the main ideas of T. Hobbes’s "encyclopaedic works", but also contemporary discussions on the political philosophy of the latter, and also explores the basic concepts and principles of Hobbes’s political anthropology: from his image of man to the philosophy of power, who needs further research and development precisely in the stream of his political philosophy. This is especially true of Hobbes’ Leviathan and his work "De Cive" reflections on power, justice and freedom, as the cornerstone of his political philosophy. In addition, the understanding of the essence of political anthropology, outlined in the work of O. Höffe (1987) "Political justice" and developed in the collection of articles under his editorship "Man – a political animal? Essay on Political Anthropology" (Höffe, 1992) also points to the fruitful understanding of the philosophical work of Thomas Hobbes precisely in line with political anthropology.

As O. Höffe rightly believes, one should speak about a significant component of modern political philosophy and its fundamental problem – the problem of justice. In this context, it was Hobbes who initiated the search for the answer to the question: "Are there really such natural interests (and, consequently, the interests of mankind), which would prove to be useful, or vice versa – against, social, more precisely, political, that is, form-forming in relation to the state and rights, powers of coercion?" (Höffe, 1987, p. 139).

Therefore, political philosophy is the core of philosophical anthropology, because it enables an understanding of the fundamental issues of human existence – justice and freedom. Thanks to the works of Hobbes, the essence (and the falsity of simplified interpretations of the heritage of the latter) of the relationship of the cooperative and conflict man’s vision was revealed.

The problems of modern political anthropology are formulated in the form of finding answers to questions about the main ways, ways of justification (by definition) of the natural state and the basic human fears and aspirations of the basic principles of social existence. As we have already noted, in the very idea of a social contract, which underlies all social agreements and acts as a fundamental legitimation, the basic problems of modern political philosophy and anthropology are rooted. The essence of these problems can be formulated not only as a dilemma of cooperation or conflict, or happiness or freedom. Thanks to Hobbes, we not only can, but we must constantly assert that no one, even under the fear of death, can think otherwise than convinces his own mind. And from this he follows his idea of external humility in internal disobedience, which should lead the philosopher and subsequently leads to the idea of freedom of conscience as "human rights and citizen", to the understanding of individual independence, which is not only permissible, but must be recognized as state power.

The most famous work of Hobbes begins with a section about man, his passions and virtues, which has a significant not only methodological but also socio-practical content. The man in his "Leviathan" and other works is both strong and weak at the same time, and his image and life appear to be organically interconnected. Fortunately, the fruitful grains of his reflections have not been destroyed along with his age, but have quite successfully survived to this day: an evil, aggressive person needs a strong state, as soon as it directs for the better, it becomes able to manifest its spiritual, divine origin, and then the state becomes less cruel. Thus, the core of the Hobbes understanding of man is the idea that a person, having received a state, may and must (already in a social state) strive to become "like God":

Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another, supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what will become of a criminal recons what he has seen follow on the like crime before, having this order of thoughts; the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Which kind of thoughts is called foresight, and prudence, or providence, and sometimes wisdom. (Hobbes, 2005, p. 16)

Good and evil are also interconnected, do not derive from the nature of the objects themselves, but depend on the person "that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 39).

These thesis Hobbes (2005) not only supplement the definition of the three types of good and evil, but also notes that "all appetite, desire, and love is accompanied with some delight more or less; and all hatred and aversion with more or less displeasure and offence" (p. 41).

It can also be argued that Hobbes’s negative human qualities, which are especially noticeable at the time of shameless accumulation of initial capital, are fundamentally relevant to the present. It is about covetousness, which always has a shade of shame, and ambition, as a desire for a position and an award. However, when defining vanity, Hobbes does not forget about fame as awareness of his own strength and abilities and the strength on them. When self-confidence "grounded on the flattery of others, or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called vainglory" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 44).

In the transitional era, important are the lack of sympathy and solidarity, virtues which are the consequence and the basis of justice: contempt for other people can be regarded as cruelty derived from self-confidence, and the combination of man’s upset by the wealth and honour of other people with an endeavour Destroy the rival or become an obstacle – that’s what envy is.

Before defining happiness as essential (together with freedom) as a constituent of the fundamental questions of political anthropology, Hobbes stops on such virtues as honesty and dignity, and then outlines the primitive and constitutive meaning of eternal and unceasing desire by a man of ever greater power. Therefore dignity of a person "is a thing different from the worth or value of a man, and also from his merit or desert, and consisteth in a particular power or ability for that whereof he is said to be worthy" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 83).

In defining happiness as a constant movement from one object to another, Hobbes emphasizes that this often refers to the superiority of such a general human inclination as "a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 85).

And most importantly, what is the main reason for such an inclination? That is, according to Hobbes, not so much about the desire for ever greater pleasure that accompanies the authorities, so much so that greater and greater power ensures the proper level of already existing power and prosperity. And the people who are powerless to obey the authorities are prompted by the desire for peace and security. Moreover, "fear of oppression disposeth a man to anticipate or to seek aid by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 87).

Already here, Hobbes outlines the switchover from the anthropological component to the theory of the transaction, which is why his interpretation of power must be especially served. Note that Hobbes’s interpretation of power is not as unambiguous as some of his critics say: it is not just about the unlimited desire of material goods, the latter become subject to the phenomenon of power when the distribution begins among many friends and servants:

Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. (Hobbes, 2005, p. 107)

And the weakest can kill the strongest, united with other people. Continuing his reflections, Hobbes (2005) emphasizes that equality is the basis of distrust, and the latter motivates the desire of the authorities: "And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long till he sees no other power great enough to endanger him" (p. 108).

The same people feel great bitterness in staying in a society without power, and in the very nature of man we find, according to Hobbes (2005), rivalry, uncertainty and aspiration for glory: "Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man" (p. 109), which is not inherent only stagnation in all spheres of social life, and above all, constant fear and danger of violent death, which transforms human life into a lonely, poor and short one. However, the marked constant fear and danger of violent death and the desire for a peaceful life make people not only prone to peace, but outline the foundations of a peace agreement. To understand these principles, Hobbes again refers to the definition of freedom as the absence of obstacles to the free and prudent use of power.

It is from this awareness of power that there is an opportunity to overcome the state of war, the ability and necessity for a person to: "lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing anything he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 114).

Thus, describing the natural state through the statement of the desire (equal to the violent death) of people to self-preservation, happiness and power, Hobbes emphasizes – the word is too weak an irritant of human passions and cannot be compared to the fear of a strong, authorized compelled authority. Because of this weakness of only one word to force people to execute their agreements, there is human existence, Hobbes (2005) points out, only two ways to strengthen them: "And those are either a fear of the consequence of breaking their word, or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it" (p. 123).

Only in the context of an agreement you can talk about justice and injustice. The actual notions of not only concluding and observing agreements, but also the way out of the natural state and establishment of the state, are actualized:

Therefore before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant, and to make good that propriety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth. (Hobbes, 2005, p. 125)

The State becomes essentially fundamental to property and justice: "So that the nature of justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants, but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is also that propriety begins" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 126).

Hobbes also argues that the basic principles of a social contract and the human desire to act fairly and impartially do not come from the unconditionally universal structures of the mind, but from the conditional, categorical, conventionally agreed refusal, the prohibition to participate in a disastrous general social conflict. Moreover, the principle of justice based on such an agreement is not actually a metaphysical, universalizing justice, but only a temporary principle, which needs (for its own compliance) further state-political legitimization. The same thanks to T. Hobbes has articulated the importance of realizing the justice of the modern world – the mutual rejection of freedom must occur in certain, generally recognized limits. How does Hobbes answer the question of what it means to be a free person:

And according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, a freeman is he that, in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to. But when the words free and liberty are applied to anything but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion is not to subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said, for example, the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. (Hobbes, 2005, p. 40)

In other words, Hobbes continues, human freedom is that it performs as its will and desire point to it. Moreover, in his opinion, fear and freedom are also compatible, and human actions for fear of laws are also voluntary, because he can hold out from them.

True, D. Hume, beginning with a critical understanding of modern contractualism, considered somewhat naive thinking about the fact that power structures are established only by agreement. In his opinion, the binding nature of social orders may have initially contractual nature, but subsequently gradually loses it, obtaining an independent, independent of the arrangements of the force. Hume warns against the danger of imposing the unlimited power of the ruler and insists – only the principles of general and binding for all laws can protect the life and property of each person. It is this (polemically directed against Hobbes) the idea of the rule of law over the legitimate will of the ruler consistently advocated J.-J. Rousseau. When Hobbes tends to the advantages of the political system and the "kingdom of the earth", Hume gravitates to an internal moral law that updates his reflections in the context of the newest critical discourses of the social contract (E. Tugendhat, А. MacIntyre, and others) and the conventional interpretation of nature and the essence of morality.

Thus, Hobbes desired to realize comprehensively the rooted, in his opinion, depending on the security of freedom from the security of the relationship between the state and the citizen, the sovereign and the subject, transforming (but in due course, through the work of Locke and Rousseau) the landscapes distorted by the selfish interest of political existence into an intimate just political space. The latter tends to the internal moral law and prefers the interpretation of the state system as a free, and not alienated subordination of individuals to a certain supreme moral law, which receives the title of general will: I adhere to such an agreement, individuals take responsibility to be guided in their actions only by reason. It should also be emphasized that the morality of a person and his good attitude to other people are due to the relations of equality and solidarity, and vice versa, in the unequal conditions of social existence, people turn into atomic selfishness.


Yet in the theory of social contract of T. Hobbes, who "defeated the traditional priority of a man over the individual and the responsibility over the right" (Maier, 2002, p. 221), it is said that each "small" person is a leak, both personal and institutional freedom and justice, concluding, first of all, an agreement with themselves, with their ambitions and consciences, and then with other people and the state. Everything mentioned above to a certain extent, as Laurens van Apeldoorn (2019) points out in the contextual special for the Ukrainian social space article "On the Person and the Office of the Sovereign in Hobbes’s Leviathan" refers to the sovereign, his actions as an "ordinary person" and actions of a sovereign as a politician as an artificial person who embodies the state in the head office. Proposed by the author interpretation of Hobbes’ "Leviathan" became the development of the idea of the possibility of a constitutional restriction of the actions of the sovereign (state authority), the continuation of the discussion about the relations of the sovereign of a person and the civil society.

And, secondly, the deep transformations and crisis phenomena of modern society actualize over and over again the comprehension of the place and role of social contract in modern society. The particular relevance, it is the newest, often critical, aimed at understanding the heuristic meaning and the limits of modern contractualism, acquired for post-Soviet countries, which seek to build their states as legal and democratic. After all, democracy, at least in its most significant definition, is nothing but power, based on a social contract. In addition, the desire to combine the empirical and normative dimensions of contemporary social and political philosophy, to overcome the deep gap between philosophical discourses and real being, and to find the answer to the question of real and worthy ways out of the already described T. Hobbes’s state of "a war as is of every man against every man" and devaluations based on freedom and courage, moral virtues, social justice in general.

Of course, such a desirable and hard-to-reach presence of common interest and consent based on mutual trust will help people (better than any contract) to act in a coordinated manner to achieve a common goal. And in order to remain in the area of justice and morals, it is necessary not only to get rid of formal agreements and to replace them with real deals, but to adhere to these agreements, without changing them to the advantage of ruling elites or clans. Thirdly, it is thanks to Hobbes that the significance of understanding the role of a social contract is not only for the constitution of the state, but also for its further functioning as a community of citizens who have the opportunity to live freely and discuss the actual social problems.

Consequently, the principle of a social contract rooted in the philosophy of man, actualizes not only the problem of justice, but also the problem of freedom and the rule of law as an essential moral and legal way of existence of modern society. A well-formulated idea is that the discourse of the social contract contains fundamental philosophical questions about the nature of man and the source of socialism, the nature of the interaction of people in society and the ways of its regulation, the nature of morality and law, the relation of coercion and freedom in society requires further research and development.

Thus, it is worth noting that the arguments of Communitarists against liberalism can already be overcome within the framework of a liberal paradigm, since individual rights and freedoms are carried out only in a certain social context. O. Höffe begins with the fact that historically, liberalism and individualism grew together. However, this is different doctrines. Liberalism is a doctrine of political morality that focuses on the issue of personal freedom. Individualism is a moral doctrine. It is related to liberalism in the same way that liberalism is related to democracy, which is interpreted as the theory of political institutions. Liberalism can reign as a basis for democracy, although it can be achieved for democratic purposes and on other grounds, each of which presupposes a democratic theory in a slightly different way (Höffe, 1996). It is also advisable to speak of communitarianism as an addition to liberalism, and the limitation of the application of the theory of social contract to the basic structure of a particular society was theoretically weak and rather fragile, since the public agreement should primarily concern the principles of "external" (global) justice. The latter should be interpreted in the search for algorithms to overcome global economic inequality and a new understanding of the subject of justice.


T. Hobbes has already emphasized that the reasons for violations of the social contract and hostility between people are rooted in the very nature of man and can be distinguished for the following three reasons: competition, distrust and vanity. It is the lack of trust that leads to violence and unfair claims of life and property of other people. This is also accompanied by desire, also in any way, more respect and recognition. Due to the absence of trust people appear to each other not as citizens, equal members of the public agreement, but as distressed competitors. Of particular relevance to the further study of T. Hobbes’s philosophy is its profound, intellectual courage, reflection on man and his social being: "And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 3).

Already from the time of Hobbes, thanks to Hobbes, the significance of the trust of the participants in the social contract has become clear, which, in contrast to suspicion and distrust, transforms atomic, selfish individuals into real citizens.

Constructed in the context of a modern social project, political anthropology of T. Hobbes justified the issue of interaction between freedom and justice, which is fundamentally important to nowadays, through the search for such a way of social relations, in which an individual, being in the realm of social existence, would seek to limit his own selfishness and freedom for the sake of the common will of the majority. Thanks to Hobbes, the idea of external humility in disobedience to the inner, of freedom of conscience as a "human and citizen", of an understanding of individual independence, which is not just a permissible but accepted by state power, has been acquired with exceptional theoretical and practical meaning. Thanks to Hobbes’s works, the essence (and the falsity of simplified interpretations of the latter’s heritage) was revealed by the relationship between the cooperative and the conflicted vision of man.


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1*Інститут філософії імені Г. С. Сковороди, Національна академія наук України (Київ, Україна),
пошта, ORCID 0000-0002-7198-9157
2*Черкаський інститут пожежної безпеки імені Героїв Чорнобиля Національного університету цивільного захисту
України (Черкаси, Україна), ел. пошта, ORCID 0000-0002-8898-9743




Мета. Мета дослідження полягає у критичній реконструкції теорії суспільної угоди Томаса Гоббса як важливої засади не лише модерної політичної антропології, а і модерного та постмодерного соціальних проєктів. А також – у розгортанні принципово важливої і для новітніх соціально-філософських та філософсько-антропологічних дискурсів тези про те, що кожна окрема людина є витоком, як персональної так і інституційної свободи та справедливості, укладаючи передусім угоду з собою, зі своїми прагненнями та сумлінням, а вже потім з іншими людьми та державою. Теоретичний базис. Принципово важливим, методологічно-значущим та актуальним для сучасної політичної антропології став запроваджений Гоббсом принцип суспільної угоди як новий суспільний принцип регуляції діяльності, що засвідчує про істотний для сучасної політичної філософії та філософії права перехід від телеологічних (античних та середньовічних) до правових (сучасних) уявлень про справедливість. Для поглибленого дослідження філософсько-антропологічних аспектів контрактуалізму Гоббса в якості необхідного постало використання історико-порівняльного методу та методу контекстуалізацї, а також праць провідних вітчизняних та зарубіжних гоббсознавців, які обстоюють положення про органічну приналежність фундаментальних соціально-філософських та філософсько-антропологічних питань про природу людини, співвідношення примусу, свободи і справедливості до дискурсу суспільної угоди. Наукова новизна. На підставі послідовного аналізу антропологічної складової Гоббсової теорії суспільної угоди запропоновано поглиблене розуміння модерного контрактуалізму та сучасних дискусій в царині його екзистенційно-анторопологічної складової, а також доведено тезу про те, що саме політична антропологія є осердям антропології філософської, бо уможливлює методологічно-значуще розуміння засадничих для людського буття проблем – взаємодії справедливості та свободи, власного інтересу та суспільного блага, а також досить чітко окреслює шляхи подолання дилеми лібералізму і комунітаризму, індивідуалізму і голізму. Висновки. Розбудована в контексті модерного соціального проєкту політична антропологія Т. Гоббса обґрунтувала принципово важливе й до сьогодні уявлення про взаємодію свободи і справедливості через пошук такого способу соціальних взаємин, за яких окрема людина, перебуваючи в царині соціального буття прагнула б обмеження власного егоїзму та свободи заради колективної волі більшості. Завдяки Гоббсу набули непересічного теоретичного та практичного сенсу ідеї про зовнішню покору при непокорі внутрішній, про свободу совісті як "права людини і громадянина", про розуміння індивідуальної незалежності, яка є не просто дозволеною, а визнаною державною владою. Завдяки творам Гоббса виявилась сутність (та хибність спрощених тлумачень спадщини останнього) взаємозв’язку кооперативного та конфліктного образу людини.

Ключові слова: суспільна угода; людина; справедливість; свобода; влада; держава


1*Институт философии имени Г. С. Сковороды, Национальная академия наук Украины (Киев, Украина),
эл. почта, ORCID 0000-0002-7198-9157
2*Черкасский институт пожарной безопасности имени Героев Чернобыля Национального университета гражданской
защиты Украины (Черкассы, Украина), эл. почта, ORCID 0000-0002-8898-9743




Цель. Цель исследования заключается в критической реконструкции теории общественного договора Томаса Гоббса как важной основы не только современной политической антропологии, но и современного и постмодернистского социальных проектов. А также – в развертывании принципиально важного и для новейших социально-философских и философско-антропологических дискурсов тезиса о том, что каждый отдельный человек является источником, как персональной, так и институциональной свободы и справедливости, заключая, прежде всего, договор с собой, со своими стремлениями и совестью, а уже потом с другими людьми и государством. Теоретический базис. Принципиально важным, методологически значимым и актуальным для современной политической антропологии стал разработанный Гоббсом принцип общественного договора в качестве нового общественного принципа регуляции деятельности, который засвидетельствовал значимый для современной политической философии и философии права переход от телеологических (античных и средневековых) к правовым (современным) представлениям о справедливости. Для углубленного исследования философско-антропологических аспектов контрактуализма Гоббса использованы историко-сравнительный метод и метод контекстуализации, а также работы ведущих отечественных и зарубежных исследователей Гоббса, которые разрабатывают идеи об органической принадлежности фундаментальных социально-философских и философско-антропологических вопросов о природе человека, соотношения принуждения, свободы и справедливости к дискурсу общественного договора. Научная новизна. На основе последовательного анализа антропологической составляющей теории общественного договора Гоббса предложено углубленное понимание современного контрактуализма и современных дискуссий в области его экзистенциально-антропологической составляющей, а также обоснован тезис о том, что именно политическая антропология является сердцевиной антропологии философской, так как делает возможным методологически значимое понимание основных для человеческого бытия проблем – взаимодействия справедливости и свободы, собственного интереса и общественного блага, а также достаточно четко определяет пути преодоления дилеммы либерализма и коммунитаризма, индивидуализма и холизма. Выводы. Разработанная в контексте современного социального проекта политическая антропология Т. Гоббса обосновала принципиально важное и сегодня представление о взаимодействии свободы и справедливости через поиск такого способа социальных отношений, при которых отдельный человек, находясь в области социального бытия, стремился бы к ограничению собственного эгоизма и свободы ради коллективной воли большинства. Благодаря Гоббсу приобрели непреходящий теоретический и практический смысл идеи о внешнем подчинении при неповиновении внутреннем, о свободе совести как "права человека и гражданина", о понимании индивидуальной независимости, которая выступает не просто разрешенной, а признанной государственной властью. Благодаря произведениям Гоббса выявлена сущность (и ошибочность упрощенных толкований наследия последнего) взаимосвязи кооперативного и конфликтного образа человека.

Ключевые слова: общественный договор; человек; справедливость; свобода; власть; государство

Received: 18.11.2019

Accepted: 15.05.2020

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