Empathy, Intentionality and "Other Mind": from Phenomenology to Contemporary Versions of Naturalism

Purpose. This article discusses researching the nature and basic structure of acts of empathy. Such research first requires answering the question: are empathic acts intentional acts of our consciousness? If the answer to this question is affirmative, then there is a need to answer the following questions: what are the features of acts of empathy as intentional ones? And can such acts be qualified as opening a special and complex type of access (epistemic, social, and ethical) to "other minds"?

Theoretical basis. The research is based on the problems set by the phenomenological tradition and the developed analytical philosophy, which found their continuation in the philosophy of mind. With the tendency to naturalization, representatives of these areas have another common sphere in the research of mental reality. The changes that both traditions are undergoing can be observed in the transformation of fundamental theoretical concepts such as "intentionality". The linguistic turn gives impetus to the development of new theoretical approaches to the understanding of consciousness, which give preference to the research of language rather than the research in the structure of the Self. The change in methodological guidelines is due to a few factors. In particular, this is a noticeable progress in empirical sciences and the dominance of Behaviorism guidelines in psychology, as well as the fact that the Anglo-American tradition inherits several features intrinsic to British empiricism. Today, three main directions of understanding intentionality can be distinguished. Starting from Brentano and Husserl, we have a classical theory – mental intentionality (phenomenological). As part of analytical philosophy and philosophy of language, we can talk about linguistically interpreted intentionality. Sellars’ model of intentionality has a definite linguistic component. Also, a modern version that functions in the philosophy of consciousness: attempts to naturalize intentionality (this is, for example, the research of Galen Strawson and Daniel Dennett).

Originality. The problem is studied not in the context of the phenomenological or analytical traditions in their isolation, but in a problematic-conceptual way, which allows us to reach a new level of generalization and reveal the theoretical advantages of combining both traditions. Conclusions. Empathic Acts can be defined as intentional within the classical phenomenological tradition. As intentional acts, they have their specificity in that they are directed to the "other mind" and can form the basis for the research of intersubjectivity. For the analytic tradition and early philosophy of consciousness, such statements are not obvious. However, discussions about the role of corporeality and the problem concerning embodied cognition are becoming increasingly common today. In such discussions, empathy, as an element in the knowledge of others and a possibility for grounding the social sciences, seems more promising than attempts to make epistemic access to other minds possible on the basis of the argument by analogy or on the basis of the inference to the best explanation.

Keywords: human beings; empathy; "other minds"; mental reality; intentionality; phenomenology; analytic philosophy; Theory of mind debate

Introduction

Intentionality is undoubtedly one of the fundamental characteristics of the mental. Intentionality is an important concept both for philosophy in general and for philosophy of consciousness in particular. Empathy, as one of the possibilities and means of access to "other consciousnesses", forms an epistemological alternative to the "argument by analogy" in early versions of phenomenology. Methodological attempts to replace argumentation by analogy with a more grounded and persuasive strategy of argumentation opened up new conceptual possibilities for overcoming solipsism, which haunted philosophers throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries.
In fact, the field of "intention" covers a number of separate phenomena, the gradual layering of which in the history of philosophy partly explains the content of the modern term "intentionality", torn between the models of Husserlian phenomenology and the English-language "philosophy of mind". (Libera, 2016)

The presented quotation from the "European Dictionary of Philosophy" and sets the main line and direction of our searches in this research. It is this "between" (that is, the intermediate and still not clearly defined sphere of methodological searches and disputes) that will serve us as the theoretical context of this exploration.

This search can be facilitated by a theoretical attempt to creatively combine the methodological approaches of phenomenology and analytical philosophy. Such an attempt includes obvious advantages, but, unfortunately, it has not yet attracted sufficient attention from domestic researchers. The issue regarding the "other consciousnesses" is central to our problematics, since the issue of the phenomena of empathy is not so much an independent problem as a component of solving other problems, in particular, epistemological or ethical ones. It is worth noting that this was actively discussed throughout the history of philosophy, especially since Descartes. This is an issue of our own consciousness. In modern philosophy of consciousness and phenomenology, widely represented in the Theory of Mind debate, this debate takes place between supporters of two "theories": Theory Theory and Simulation Theory. Accordingly, the problem of "other consciousnesses" depends on whether we consider our consciousness to be the only one that we can know. And also from the questions: what does it mean to "know other consciousness" and how does this knowledge differ from "knowing one’s own consciousness"?

**Purpose**

Revealing the purpose stated in the abstract, we propose to answer the question of whether researchers have succeeded in justifying empathy as an alternative to reasoning by analogy. For accomplishing the set goals, it is important to formulate a number of tasks.

First, let us turn to key phenomenological thinkers (Theodor Lipps, Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Max Scheler) who research empathy precisely as a specific field of intentional acts. Secondly, we will consider the still little-researched attempts to conceptualize mental acts (and empathy in particular) in the works of American researchers who worked within the analytical tradition. Thirdly, we will define the hybrid forms in the combination of modern neuroscience of phenomenology and elements of analytical philosophy in the answer to the issue of access to "other consciousness".

Also, an essential issue for us is the problem of methodological duality, which allows us to investigate empathy from different perspectives, as affective or rational (cognitive). This determines the difference and closeness in the approaches of analytical philosophy and phenomenology.
Statement of basic materials

Most researchers who build their research on the basis of phenomenology will agree that empathy is an intentional act. Moreover, it will be determined by a separate type of intentionality. If we proceed from such an assumption, then there is rather a statement than a formulation of the problem before us. What then is the problematization of the given topic? This is the actualization of the problem of empathy precisely as epistemological problematics, namely the problematics of social cognition. Theodor Lipps sets this direction, which, in fact, opens a new chapter in our perception of ourselves and others.

Dan Zahavi is a contemporary phenomenologist and one of the most experienced researchers of this period and of empathy phenomena in general. He is presented in our research with one of his major articles on this topic. It gives us an insight into the key issues in the early stages of empathy research and finds out how these issues are being developed today.

Let us review the main theses of Dan Zahavi’s (2014) article "Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality". Following the founders of phenomenology, Zahavi does not cast doubt whether the phenomena of empathy are a variety of intentional acts. However, as can be seen from the very title of the article, empathy is not just intentionality, but a special kind of intentionality aimed at others. And in his opinion, we should understand that there is no certain way to know "other consciousness", because any hypothesis will have its flaws. We cannot rely enough on empathy as a way of knowing others, but neither is the argument by analogy a reliable tool for accessing the minds of others. Therefore, it is important to look for opportunities in a certain way to combine all the options available to us to access other mind and their knowledge (Zahavi, 2014, p. 141).

In support of his opinion, Zahavi compares four classical models of interpretation of empathy phenomena as intentional acts. Theodor Lipps, Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Edith Stein had a common view that the "argument by analogy" is not capable of solving the problem of "other consciousnesses". For them, a much more promising way of solving this problem is the thematization of a complex of phenomena that fall under the common concept of "empathy". At that time, the concept of empathy was not unified. Einfühlung, Fellow feeling, Sympathy – could mean thinking about the same concept.

We should add a few clarifications regarding the problem of "other consciousnesses" and the "argument from analogy". Arguments from analogy, sometimes also in literature we see "inference by analogy" (Analogieschluss). Usually, when the formulation of this argument is mentioned, they refer to John Stuart Mill and his work "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy and of The Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in his Writings", in which he formulates several central provisions. It is with these provisions that Lipps will debate in the future, developing theoretical possibilities of alternative access to "other consciousnesses".

Inference theory is based on generalization and induction, it is the usual argument of following (basic logic). Mill extrapolates it to our knowledge of others. Thus, we cannot know the unobservable conscious experience of others, but we can observe their behaviour. However, Mill himself does not claim that this is a sufficient argument. According to Janice Thomas:

Mill’s name is widely associated outside ethics and political thought and for which he is remembered is a version of an argument which was not
A question was whether we can infer the "internal" (pain, for example) from the "external" (behavior)? Pain and behavior are seen as radically different kinds of things (Sayward, 2003). Turning to analogy, according to Mill, is a good way out of such a situation. So, the classic argument from which the discussion began was as follows: others have a body similar to mine, and they react to pain and other external stimuli in a similar way to me – this allows me to conclude that a reaction similar to mine is created by mental states the same as I have.

It should be noted that today, and in general since the middle of the 20th century, polemics do not so often refer us to Mill and the argument by analogy. Mostly we will face discussions with an inference to the best explanation. The inference to the best explanation is that we do not have indisputable knowledge about the consciousness of others, but we have more grounds to believe in the existence of consciousness in other people than to not believe in their existence. These two arguments in modern research help us to distance the two main strands (which create the Theory of Mind debate), namely Theory Theory (TT – hereafter) and Simulation Theory (ST – hereafter). These theories should be briefly defined. TT, as the name suggests, bases our understanding of ourselves and others on the human propensity to create theories. It is within this approach that we get to know the so-called "Folk Psychology". We are talking about a theory of "common sense" that offers us an explanation of intentions, desires, and other human intentions. The inference to the best explanation tends towards this theory. Since all knowledge according to this approach is precisely theoretically inferential, our own experience is also theoretically mediated. ST comes a little later and inherits the main features of the argument by analogy together with Lipps’ ideas about imitation and projection. In this approach to consciousness, we don’t need any theories at all, and our mind is a sufficient model-making tool.

It is also worth adding a few words about the reason behind the request to overcome the argument by analogy. The end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century is the period of emerging new philosophical trends. Especially, phenomenology and analytical philosophy arise as projects seeking to overcome solipsism in epistemology. Both Gottlob Frege (one of the fathers of analytic philosophy) and Edmund Husserl (the founder of phenomenology) have sought to overcome psychologism in mathematics and logic. It is noteworthy, that there are two types of solipsism: epistemological and conceptual. Although the argument by analogy is offered as a way to avoid the first kind of solipsism, it could be argued that it is really about the second. Essentially, the point is that using the analogy argument as a way to avoid epistemological solipsism (the only mind I can know is my own) contradicts conceptual solipsism (the only mind I can think of is my own) (Avramides, 2019).

After preliminary terminological and conceptual clarification, let us turn to the history of this problem.

Lipps (Leitfaden der Psychologie, article Das Wissen and other works) was one of the first who tried to criticize this approach and offer a methodological and conceptual alternative in
solving the problem of knowing the consciousness of "others". In the future, ideas from Lipps would play a vital role in the creation of Simulation Theory (namely his imitation hypothesis). After the discovery of mirror neurons, Lipps’s hypothesis (in a naturalistic way) was developed by Vittorio Gallese. For this researcher, empathy is a form of inner imitation, and it is this that allows us to understand the feelings and emotions of others, and this process involves a neurophysiological correlate (Gallese, 2003).

Lipps understands empathy as an unconscious inner imitation. Observing others activates an unconscious reaction in us, we can repeat their movements, and this will be a certain spontaneous imitation of the actions of another subject. Lipps has been criticized for precisely this – that empathic understanding is not reducible to copying (Bortolan & Magri, 2022). Reproduction of gestures also evokes in us a certain feeling, which is associated with the action that was imitated. This is what eventually enables interpersonal understanding (Zahavi, 2014).

An important contribution to the discussion is considered to be Lipps’s division into three types of knowledge: (1) knowledge of external objects, (2) knowledge of oneself, and (3) knowledge of other persons. For each type of knowledge, there is a separate type of cognitive ability, respectively: (1) perception, (2) introspection, (3) empathy. It is important to note that for Lipps, empathy is a separate type (kind) of knowledge (modality of knowledge sui generis).

The models of Husserl, Stein, and Scheler (and Scheler’s model is different from the first two) differ from Lipps and the current dominant models today. Lipps has been criticized mostly for not changing his view of our own access to our consciousness and for his theory of imitation.

In the phenomenological tradition, in research on the problem of empathy, Husserl, of course, sets both the methodology and the very style of further analysis. Empathy for Husserl is not any kind of inference, even done unconsciously (Moran & Cohen, 2013). But this does not mean that empathy is an emotional state in which we "feel" others. This is also not a typical perception of external things. This is a certain type of representation, where the Other still remains the Other, we do not identify ourselves with it. Empathy is a type of quasi-perception, not inference or simulation, but perception itself.

Two concepts of empathy are developed in detail: Max Scheler (Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Haß, and Wesen und Formen der Sympathie), and Edith Stein (Zum Problem der Einfühlung, and Beiträge Zur Philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie Und der Geisteswissenschaften). Both concepts are based on a number of similar foundations: in particular, it is a critique of Lipps’s concept and a critique of the argument by analogy. We will successively consider both of these foundations. Zahavi (2010) provides an apt summary of Scheler’s views: "On his view, the argument by analogy underestimates the difficulties involved in self-experience and overestimates the difficulties involved in the experience of others" (p. 179).

We see the most extensive criticism of the argument by analogy in Scheler’s work. For Scheler, empathy is what allows me to understand the experience of another (living through the experience of others). This does not mean that the experience of the other is transferred to me, it means that I live through the experience that I observe in the other person. For Scheler, the way in which we experience the emotions of others is different from the way in which we experience our own emotions. He rejects the assumption that empathy is based on a direct association between signals coming from others and one’s own experience (similar to the experience of the other). Reproducing one’s own experience would distort the experience of others and inevitably
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lead to errors. For Scheler (2017), a source of error is also the idea that empathy requires similarity between the one who empathizes and the one who is the target of this empathy (pp. 46-47).

Proponents of the argument by analogy are based on erroneous assumptions, according to Scheler: (1) that access to my own consciousness is not under a question mark; (2) access to other’s consciousness is definitely not direct, neither to feelings nor to thoughts.

Regarding Scheler, special attention should be paid to his dividing the phenomena of "sympathy". Scheler uses the term "sympathy" for several reasons: an attempt to distance himself in some way from the concept developed by Lipps; it is also related to the tradition of using the term "sympathy" by Adam Smith and David Hume (Breyer, 2020; Debes, 2015). The majority of researchers say that it is not necessary to translate Scheler’s term namely as sympathy since a significant part of his research indicates what we mean by the term "empathy" today. The following basic types of sympathy must be distinguished: (1) "feeling-together" (German Mit-einander-Fühlen), (2) "feeling-after" (Nachfühlen), (3) "feeling-with" (Mitgefühl), "feeling-influence" (emotional contagion, Gefühlsansteckung), and (5) "feeling-one" or "emotional unification" (Einsfühlung) (Scheler, 2017). This division is relevant to this day. Changes since Scheler’s time still confirm to the influence of Scheler’s approach. Another feature of this approach is that it allows you to identify and describe the negative features of empathy. For example: in order to cause pain, you need to understand it. This is evidenced by historical facts. For example, a professional executioner in the Middle Ages and early Modern times (we are talking about Europe) had to be well-versed in human feelings and emotional states – to do one’s job professionally: to torture (for example, to obtain evidence). It is clear that such aspects of empathy have little to do with morality.

At the beginning of the 2000s, after the long dominance of behaviorism and the first attempts to create a neurophilosophy based on physicalism, it became increasingly clear that the research of consciousness should also include the first-person conscious human experience, as well as take into account the peculiarities of our perception of others. The topic, in which early phenomenologists were engaged, is taking on a new development in modern research of consciousness. The works of Husserl, Scheler and Stein attract more and more attention from analytical philosophers.

According to Alasdair MacIntyre (2006), Husserl wanted to see in Stein’s research a kind of analytical dialogue with Lipps (pp. 67-68). Stein’s (1989) work begins in such an analytical dialogue, it agrees "that empathy as an "inner participation" in foreign experiences" (p. 12). Stein (1989) believes Lipps is mixing up the two acts: "Lipps confuses the following two acts: (1) being draw into the experience at first given objectively and fulfilling its implied tendencies with (2) the transition from non-primordial to primordial experience" (p. 13).

Stein concludes that empathy can be more adequately described through a series of defining properties. First of all, the phenomenon of empathy is not a separate emotion (like shame or embarrassment) but is a name for a peculiar form (sui generis form) of intentionality directed at others.

In the first two decades of the 20th century, the most significant works were created, which substantiated the thesis that our knowledge of Others should not be grounded on solipsistic arguments but can be immediate and sensual, and this is embedded in human nature. For some time, this thesis was not perceived as having sufficient grounds. And phenomenology was considered a variant of transcendentalism. Early versions of physicalism did not consider introspection or empathy as a method of knowing. Over time, the naturalistic approach began to change, and variants for combining phenomenology with analytical philosophy and neuroscience began to appear.
In his article, modern phenomenologist Søren Overgaard (2010) thus summarizes the problem of answering the question of what access we have to someone else’s consciousness – this is a distinction between two approaches (1) conservative and (2) revisionist (p. 257).

The first conservative approach somehow returns us to Cartesian positions: the only consciousness we know is directly ours; there are two kind of substances, material body (extension) and mental substance (thought). The conservative approach acquires significant development precisely within the limits of analytical philosophy and has its continuation in the philosophy of consciousness. This approach has some Cartesian elements, namely: it assumes a distinction between behavior and mental states (it does not matter whether these states are material or not), the main thing is that the mental states of others are inaccessible to us.

This approach includes both the argument by analogy and the inference to the best explanation. Overgaard quite successfully describes why exactly these arguments cannot be a sufficient solution to the problem of other mind. Let us briefly reproduce his argumentation.

Since the argument by analogy, as far as we remember, is an inductive argument, we have (as a base model) only our own behavior and our own mental states from which we can draw parallels with the mental states of others. That is, we have one single model for comparison.

The second argument, the inference to the best explanation, while overcoming the flaws and shortcomings of the first argument, only works if we can find and articulate that best explanation.

The implementation of such an approach can be seen in the example of the position of eliminative materialism. According to eliminative materialism, folk psychology can serve as a guide and basis for a simplified understanding of our interactions. However, the more we learn about the brain and the specificity of neurophysiological processes, the more we interpret mental acts and interactions between them in terms of neurobiological correlation. But in such a case, in the end, the concept of mental will be simply superfluous. And it will have to be abandoned sooner or later. This is the pronounced confrontation between TT and ST in the creation of the Theory of Mind. That is, these theories essentially belong to the same order. And their confrontation does not help to find a solution to our problem.

Our research began with a detailed description of the approaches (Lipps, Husserl, Scheler, and Stein) that, according to Overgaard, can be grouped under the name of "revisionist" approaches. And in his opinion, they are more progressive in answering questions about epistemic access to "other minds". And exactly they can offer reliable methodological tools for social sciences. However, not all researchers belonging to the phenomenological school have the same view on this issue. According to Levinas and Wandelfels, experiences close to empathy, such as sympathy, and responsiveness, have a rather non-intentional structure. These views have not become widespread and require more detailed research.

Remy Debes (2015), giving his assessment of Lipps’s criticism by Scheler and Stein, claims that in fact, they were much more grateful to him than trying to demonstrate any dismissive attitude towards his developments. This gratitude can be seen in Scheler’s address already at the beginning of the reprint of his first work devoted to the concept of "sympathy". There Scheler mentions Lipps’s thesis that "Only by the solution of this question (the problem of other minds) can sociology be established on a philosophical basis".

Thus, we can draw a preliminary conclusion: the topic of "other mind" and, accordingly, the problem of access to them, interested early phenomenologists, also because they sought to build objective sociology and develop a methodology of social cognition exactly on these bases.
In this way, we take the next step: the concept of empathy returns to the philosophical discourse. Alvin Goldman, whose name is associated with the creation of ST, brings the problem of empathy back into the sphere of modern philosophical and analytical discussions. Additional concepts of "mind-reading", "perspective-taking" and "mentalizing" arise.

Within this direction of modern analytical philosophy (although it is, in fact, a peculiar mix of a number of philosophical approaches), empathy is considered similar to what is called "mind reading". According to Goldman, mind reading is a meta-act of the second order, a meta-act of mentalization. From the standpoint of classical phenomenology, this approach is unacceptable, even erroneous.

However, following Husserl’s teachings, phenomenologists tend to consider empathy as a direct, intuitive, quasi-perceptual perception that does not require any theorization (conceptualization) of TT in our minds for further conclusions about ourselves or others, which contradicts Theory Theory. Also, empathy does not require mentalization (imitation), creating the model of other [mind] in our own consciousness, which denies Simulation Theory.

The rediscovery proclaimed by Stueber in his work "Rediscovering Empathy" refers to the return of the topic of empathy to the field of research on social problematics (issues of sociology) (Szanto & Moran, 2018). Karsten Stueber states: Phenomenology cannot be understood as an infallible guide to the structure of basic psychological mechanisms. Equally important, phenomenology cannot be understood as providing direct answers to normative epistemological issues either (Stueber, 2006, p. 17). Stueber is interesting in that he seeks to define empathy as a central element of social cognition. And he tries to do this within the framework of analytical and philosophical approaches.

The general trend of the last decades (the beginning of the 21st century) can be described as follows: after the radical projects like first Ryle (who turns mental states into behavioral dispositions), then Churchlands and Dennett (who in their early period tried to create neurophilosophy and deprive it of all unnecessary "mental" terms), various versions of "hybrid" (or synthetic) theories arise, which again begin to show an increasing interest in social epistemology.

The question of the phenomenon of empathy as a type of intentional act of consciousness takes on a new expression in the problem of collective intentionality (Szanto, Moran, Searle, Gurvitch).

At the present stage, we have devoted most of our research to the problem of empathy as an alternative to reasoning by analogy. Now it is also important to say a few words about empathy in the context of the problem of intentionality.

Attempts to "naturalize" intentionality, that is, to fundamentally change methodological approaches to intentionality (from classical-phenomenological to naturalistic) did not happen immediately. The search for a better explanation of the intentionality of consciousness took place in several stages. Here, first of all, it is worth noting the long period of dominance in the analytical tradition of the so-called "philosophy of language". In this context, it is appropriate to demonstrate another example of the combination of two intellectual traditions: phenomenological-hermeneutic (in the style of Heidegger) and analytical-philosophical. Louis Agosta’s (2010) work "From Hermeneutics to Intentionality" can be as an illustration.

Agosta attracts to his research a rather atypical transition from Martin Heidegger’s "Being and Time" to John Searle’s intentionality of mental states, which is expressed through language. The language here provides access to what cannot be revealed through other epistemological approaches (Agosta, 2010, pp. 84-85). According to the author, the problematics of language provides the key to the rehabilitation of introspection as a positive structure of consciousness (according to Heidegger).
The author [Agosta] notes about a feature of empathic intentionality is its orientation (directedness) towards the other. Without this other, specific act of intentionality cannot exist. Intentional acts of empathy target expressions of life. The intentional acts of empathy have the other as its intended target. Without the other (even an imaginary one), the act of empathy becomes an autistic gesture. Empathy is awareness of the other. There are also certain nuances here that we have to take into account. We can have empathy for animals and they for ourselves. And this leads us to think that this type of intentionality is also present in developed animals, and not exclusively in humans. This, of course, endows this form of intentionality with a biological component that we cannot explain through the aspect of language.

Agosta emphasizes that empathic intentionality is imbued with language and becomes accessible through language, although it is not reducible to it. Exactly on the basis of language, we are offered to combine the approaches of Husserl, Heidegger, and Searle to intentionality in general, and to empathy in particular. "The reason that this opportunistic conjoining of Searle at one level and Husserl at other works is that empathy includes both propositional and pre-predicative intentions. Searle hand the former, Husserl the second" (Agosta, 2010, pp. 90-92).

Today we can observe the convergence of analytical and phenomenological intellectual traditions, which takes place in the context and on the basis of naturalistic methodology. However, this is no longer the dogmatic naturalization that prevailed in the second half of the 20th century. Modern versions of the naturalization of intentionality are much more flexible and open to different traditions (which in the last century seemed almost incompatible).

The return to social cognition through the combination of cognitive sciences, philosophy of consciousness, and phenomenology opens new perspectives for the research of consciousness and its acts, namely the 4E (embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) cognition. Let’s recall at least modern discussions about the role of the body in cognition. The problematics of empathy has become a constitutive component of research into "embodied" cognition (Newen, De Bruin, & Gallagher, 2020).

**Originality**

An assumption is being made that the lack of clear criteria for determining development and progress in the field of humanitarian studies is a vulnerable point of humanitarian research. The complex of phenomena that falls under the concept of "empathy" can be a telling example in this context. The high theoretical level of research on empathy, demonstrated by Lipps, Scheler, and Stein, was to some extent leveled off in the 1940s and 1980s of the XX century. On the other hand, an important methodological question arises: to what extent does the progress of natural sciences affect the development of the problems of human and social sciences? Is it possible to observe the reverse influence of the humanities on the natural sciences (at least at the level of the emergence of problems and the direction of their solution)? What is the level of autonomy of the humanities in the research of man and human consciousness (this question is especially relevant today)? Finally, how can one define and describe the contribution of the humanities in the specified areas of research?

**Conclusions**

The paradigm change in the understanding of mental phenomena affected both analytic philosophy and phenomenology. At some point, their positions begin to approach. There are also
shifts regarding the view of empathy and its place. Analytical philosophy and phenomenology have common roots, they arise as new projects of denial of solipsism. We tried to record the moments of their rapprochement and went through the following stages. 1. Lipps’s discovery that it is possible to approach the problem of "other minds" in a non-trivial way, the development of this direction in Husserl, and especially in Scheler and Stein. 2. A long period in denial of the achievements of phenomenology in the field of consciousness by analytical philosophy. 3. "Rediscovery" in the problem of consciousness (including "other mind") after a number of scientific discoveries (in particular, mirror neurons). 4. Corporeality (and Embodied issues) begins to play a much larger role in consciousness research, and with its role, the role of empathy in research grows.

Another theme worth mentioning is that empathy does not have a completely unified structure. There is a certain methodological ambiguity when empathy is approached as two somewhat different acts. We can agree with Zahavi and a number of authors that the difficulty with the unification of empathy is that completely different things are meant by the term Empathy. Sometimes we can note that in the research under the concept of Empathy, different objects are meant. But still, one unification was achieved. It does not simplify the understanding of the nature and essence of this phenomenon but allows for a more detailed study of various moments within the same division. The implication is the division into affective and cognitive empathy. In that case, are they both intentional? Can it be said to a certain extent that affective empathy is better researched by the methods of phenomenology, and cognitive empathy – by analytical philosophy? Will they have different research subjects, or will the difference be only in the approach? For an answer, we can turn to what happens during the naturalization of this phenomenon. But can we fully assert that it is possible to draw a parallel between phenomenology – affective empathy and analytical philosophy – cognitive empathy?

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LIST OF REFERENCE LINKS


Емпатія, інтенційність і "свідомість іншого": від феноменології до сучасних версій натуралізму

Мета. У статті передбачено дослідити природу й базову структуру актів емпатії. Таке дослідження передує з насамперед визначити зміни відповідно до запитання: чи є акти емпатії інтенційними актами нашої свідомості? Якщо відповідь позитивна, то виникає потреба відповіді на такі запитання: які особливості актів емпатії як інтенційних актів? І чи можуть ці акти бути кваліфіковані як такі, що відкривають особливий і комплексний тип доступу (епістемічний, соціальний та етичний) до "інших свідомостей"?

Теоретичний базис. Дослідження ґрунтується на проблематиці, заданій феноменологічною традицією та розробленою аналітичною філософією, що знайшли своє продовження у філософії свідомості. Iз тенденцією до натуралізації у представників цих напрямів з'являється ще одна сфера їх досліджень – ментальні реальність. Зміни, які зазнають обидві традиції, можна прослідкувати на прикладі змін до основних теоретичних змінних, таких як "інтенційність". Лінгвістичний поворот дає поштовх до розвитку нових теоретичних підходів у розумінні свідомості, що надають перевагу радше дослідженню мови, ніж дослідженню структури самості.

Лінгвістичний поворот дає поштовх до розвитку нових теоретичних підходів у розумінні свідомості, що надають перевагу радше дослідженню мови, ніж дослідженню структур інтенційності. Зокрема, це помітний поступ емпіричних наук і панування бігевіористських настанов у психології, а також той факт, що англо-американська традиція успадкує низку рис, притаманних британському епістемізму. Сьогодені можна виділити три основні напрями розуміння інтенційності. Починаючи від Брентано та Гуссерля, ми маємо класичну теорію – ментальну інтенційність (феноменологічну). У межах аналітичної філософії та філософії мови можемо стосувати реторику критичного дослідження (Селарсова модель інтенційності має визначену лінгвістичну складову). І сучасний варіант, який функціонує у філософії свідомості, – спроби натуралізувати інтенційність (це, наприклад, дослідження Галена Стросона і Деніела Деннета).

Наукова новизна. Проблему досліджено не в контексті феноменологічної або аналітичної традиції у їхній ізольованості, а в проблематико-концептуальному ключі, що дає змогу вийти на новий рівень узагальнення й виявити теоретичні переваги поєднання обох традицій. Висновки. Акти емпатії можуть бути визначені як інтенційні в межах класичної феноменологічної традиції. Їхня специфічність полягає в тому, що вони направлені на іншого та можуть становити основу для дослідження інтерсуб'єктивності. Для аналітичної традиції та ранньої філософії свідомості такі твердження не є очевидними. Проте все більшою поширеністю сьогодені набувають дискусій про роль тілесності та проблему втіленого пізнання. У таких дискусіях емпатія як елемент пізнання іншого та можливості обґрунтування соціальних наук виділяє більш перспективною, ніж спроби уможливити епістемічний доступ до інших свідомостей на засадах аргументації за аналогією або на підставі аргументу від найкращого пояснення.

Ключові слова: людина; емпатія; "свідомості інших"; ментальна реальність; інтенційність; феноменологія; аналітична філософія; Meta-Теорія свідомості

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