PHILOSOPHY OF INFORMATION AND TRANSHUMANISM: EXPLICATIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Purpose. The research is aimed at finding out the grounds, forms and essence of the correlation between the projects of information philosophy and transhumanism from the point of view of the problematics of philosophical anthropology. Attention is focused on the status of the knowing subject and the transformations of the forms of its activity within the specified correlation. Theoretical basis. Insufficient thinking on the issue of the functioning of traditional cognitive models, in particular Kant’s transcendental questioning, which formed the basis of modern rationality and classical science, in the new sociocultural reality led the authors to problematize the forms and essence of interaction and operating with knowledge and communication in the information sphere of human existence and communication. A comparative consideration of the worldviews in the information philosophy and transhumanism projects, made on the basis of a study of current scientific literature, provided an opportunity to assume the probability of implicit elimination of the problems of philosophical anthropology from the horizon of meanings of modern science through the blurring of essentially anthropological analytics. Originality. The article proves the ambivalent nature of the correlation between the projects of philosophy and transhumanism information that are externally close on the subject and problematics, and for the first time in the domestic literature, they have been compared. The content of the powerful potential of information philosophy for the development of philosophical anthropology approaches to the phenomena of the human world determined by the technological nature of civilization and the powerful sociocultural issues of modernity have been clarified. The threats of the dehumanization of the problem field in the modern science and spheres of applied digital technologies associated with transhumanism, interpreted as an ideology, are underlined. Conclusions. The analysis of theoretical positions relevant for the philosophy of information and transhumanism resulted in a number of conclusions, central among which is the statement of the "blurring" situation, the hidden elimination in the content of problematics of philosophical anthropology and its humanistic pathos within the limits of modern forms of correlation and existence in the scientific discourse of the philosophemes and ideologemes in the information philosophy and transhumanism. Epistemological phenomena of "cognitive closure" and a man as a "blind spot" in the thinking on the science and technology development, primarily communication, indicate the relevance of a full comprehensive consideration of the problems of philosophical anthropology in projects of the information philosophy and transhumanism.


Introduction
The current state in the formation of both a holistic scientific picture of the world, and worldview, ideological and axiological aspects in the social consciousness is directly correlated with the emergence of information space in the digital communication and the digital environment itself of a modern man. If we consider as a square one the position that after 2015 in the economic and social segment of civilization there is already only "big data" ("Gartner's 2015 Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies Identifies the Computing Innovations That Organizations Should Monitor", 2015), which shows the exponential growth of information content, and take into account that such arrays can only be processed using computer technology, then the question concerning the nature of reality, and above all social, ceases to be rhetorical one. Let us recall a relatively recent, absolutely serious academic debate about the concept of reality as a computer simulation of N. Bostrom (Bostrom, 2003;Swazo, 2015). This state of affairs necessitates the problematization of the question about the forms of interaction between the projects of philosophy of information (FI) and trans (post) humanism and its theoretical and practical implications in the field of philosophical anthropology. The above determines the relevance of the research.
The  Peterson, F. Vidal, N. Rescher, V. Honcharenko, and others were relevant to our exploration. In particular, the initiation of A. Sloman (1978) discussions concerning the philosophical consequences in the expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) and the hypothetical presentation of the universal paradigm of AI philosophy; the position of J. Moor and T. Bynum (2002) is more thoughtful and less optimistic and their postulation of cyber philosophy as a result of the institutionalized computerization of Western civilization and the social and philosophical implications of this process; the justification of the "computer turn" in the scientific picture of the world and the forms of conceptualization of reality in the daily and public conscience by powerful sociocultural dynamics related to information and communication technologies have determined the relevance of addressing to manifested problematics. Studies by J. McCarthy (1996) of the boundaries in the interinfluence and interaction of human intelligence, common sense and artificial intelligence, explorations of H. , devoted to the simulation of philosophical problems of intelligence and epistemology, L. Burkholder (1992), focused on the methodological and substantive aspects in "computational turn" and the resulting contemporary concept of L. Florida's philosophy of information in the context of the challenges of today associated with the exponential enhancement of sociocultural dynamics of change in the technobiocommunicative environment (Umwelt, Y. fon Ikskiul, T. Sebeok) of human life and the philosophical phenomenon of transhumanism, determine the importance of focusing attention on a particular topic. Consideration of the correlation between these phenomena is relevant, first of all, because transhumanism now claims to play the role of deus ex mashina in resolving the collisions of the human and the technogenic, and therefore, given the multiplicity of its versions, may claim the status of a practical invariant of philosophical anthropology.

Purpose
In view of the above considerations, the purpose of exploration is to solve the problem of outlining the forms of the thorough correlation between theoretical projects of the philosophy of information and transhumanism and the philosophical and anthropological meanings produced by them, as well as elucidating the practical and philosophical content of this correlation. The objectives of the study are to consider the following issues: a) the nature of formal modes of interaction between the human and the digital information environment; b) the status of human consciousness and personality in the context of such interaction; c) transformation of cognitive activity and human communication within such interaction.

Statement of basic materials
One of the founders of a rather amorphous trend in modern humanitaristics, philosophy of information, the Italian philosopher L. Floridi indirectly compares the phenomenon of information and consciousness: The life cycle of information usually involves the following stages: emergence (identification, design, authoring, etc.) networking, distribution, access, deletion, etc.), processing (collection, verification, merger, organization, indexing, classification, filtering, updating, sorting, storage, etc.) and use (monitoring, modeling, analysis, explanation, planning, forecasting, decision-making, training, learning, playing, etc.). (Floridi, 2014, p. 5) That is why information technologies, in his view, are the main forces that reconstruct reality, and therefore information assets become integral conditions "to support and further develop welfare, personal well-being and overall prosperity" (Floridi, 2014, p. 4). This, in turn, demonstrates that social communication based on information and communication platforms, into which the usual social networks and digitized business are transformed, and they are markers of humanity's entry into the stage of hyperhistory. The term "hyperhistory" can be applied to those types of information societies for which information and computer technologies are necessary for the productive functioning of a social structure as a system.
In the context of our theme and the formation of anthropocene philosophy, the questions concerning the directions and forms in the transformation of philosophy within the information space of the "digital" civilization, the hypothetical "flowering of the withered tree in philosophy" (Sloterdijk, 2002, p. 18;Kretov, & Kretova, 2017) appears to be important. While postulating the impossibility of abandoning philosophy, pointing to its "reengineering" (Floridi, 2012), L. Floridi does not at the same time detail its forms. Methodological crisis of philosophy, ascertaining of which have become commonplace since the time of M. Fuko and R. Rorty, in the last third of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the XXI century, is imposed on a conceptual crisis, expressed in the insufficiency, first of all, of the linguistic wording, fixation and methods of transmitting meaning and information in general, showing divide, a certain fundamental incongruence of traditional philosophy and digital technologies. L. Floridi (2017) argues that, so far, "philosophy speaks for itself in its own jargon" (p. 8). It cannot leave the language space of metaphysical (in Pythagorean-Platonic-Fregean, formal-logical sense of linguistic units) speculation and therefore"… philosophical discourse remains meaningless and completely oblivious, giving silence" (Floridi, 2017, p. 8).
Information as a multivalued concept is defined by cultural transformations and the semantics of reality, so FI is trying to change the order of the "philosophical scenario" by "including the new fields of philosophical research that are not yet recognized, identified, and have not yet found their place in the traditional philosophical program" (Floridi, 2002, p. 140).
On the other hand, FI, in whatever version we interpret it -whether as a "computer revolution" in philosophy (A. Sloman) or as a "computational turn" in natural science and philosophy (L. Burkholder), or as a fundamental categorical approach that explains information as an ontological basis for thinking and consciousness in general (L. Floridi), has quite understandable limitations, determined by its computational nature. The very method of question formulation and the format of receiving the answer are fundamentally different from, for example, Kant's transcendental questioning, since it is not, in fact, anthropologized, since between a person and reality and his/her thinking in consciousness arise additional mediating links -this is a program, an array of information, an algorithm, the symbolic nature of programming languages, etc. First of all, in this context, we should recall the specifics of interactivity within the information society, which is provided by the latest digital media. We are talking about the fact that instead of traditional channels of information, that is, a linear model of its transmission from the addressant to the addressee, there is a kind of place for information, it is reflected in terms of "cyberspace", "infosphere", "virtual worlds and virtual environments". This form of interactivity implies that users are left with not only a choice between "on" or "off" but also beyond their choice of "what, when and how" (Brey, & Søraker, 2009, p. 43). That is, the recipient of information, the cognitive agent, that cognizes the subject, human consciousness that generates the meanings are installed as an element of the periphery in a rigid frame structure of values. We emphasize the implicit loss of choice as eliminating the recognition of the preference for anthropic identity by default, in the perspective the loss of human personality and identity itself, which, in our view, attests not only to the technogenic nature of human concepts of transhumanism, but also to their reliance on the FI.
It is understandable that such a situation is also complicated by the specific rigidity, inflexibility of the basic epistemological model of constructing information in a digital environment and its reception by a person, say, from the Internet. Modern researchers P. Tahard (the author of the term "epistemology of the Internet", 2001) and E. Holdman point to the problems of reliability and relevance of information on the Internet. Kh. Dreifus and L. Floridi, outlining the implications of digital information for human cognition, emphasize its ambivalence for the human world, above all for the conception of human identity, as well as the established order of things in the creation, fixation and transformation of the world picture. The rapid development of information technology, including neural networks and quantum computing, suggests that information now only conditionally related to its subject matter, themes, and referents, may completely lose this connection. Thus, the emergence of the aforementioned software, which can simulate arbitrary audio and video content (deepfake), will practically deprive a person of the ability to verify the information by comparing it with reality, not even generally empirical, but only the reality of existing "here-now-so" knowledge. Obviously, that the development of this state of affairs calls into question the very criteria of forming a holistic picture of the world, and the actual autonomy of human thinking, modeling the information matrix as a closed system for humans, and the potential of critical thinking can be reduced to a simple skeptical attitude.
However, Internet hypertext, hypertext literature are arising now, and the emergence and development of non-hierarchical forms of mass collaboration among people (wiki-based online communities, the blogosphere) suggest that manipulative approach to producing information in the digital space is not a single option.
There is a general recognition in the specialized literature that "not all philosophical problems are amenable to computational modeling" (Brey, & Søraker, 2009, p. 6). But taking into account the modern philosophical concept of strong artificial intelligence by J. Sorl, it is necessary to problematise the correlation between the hypothetical conception of such intelligence and the issues fundamental to philosophical anthropology, above all the emergence of a project of the cybernetic dimension for the human world, that is, the phenomenon of transhumanism. Contemporary transhumanism, despite its diversity, generally postulates the concept of a transhuman, which in turn must become a posthuman. The works of E. Dreksler, H. Moravek, A. Sandberh, R. Khanson, N. Bostrom and D. Pirsa proceed from the postulation of fundamental human incompetence both somatic and cognitive under the conditions of futuristic shock (E. Toffler). The classical program of extropy, for example, (M. Mor, T. Morrow), in the framework of transhumanism, is practically a project of new ethics and is inextricably linked with FI and social philosophy.
And although modern transhumanism in most of its versions tries to affirm a positive axiological program, which provides a favorable prognosis for the human future in the postindustrial digital world in terms of performed technological singularity and the emergence of transhuman and posthuman, the prospects of transferring human consciousness to a digital medium and so on, yet the question of the nature of transhumanism as an inherent trend in futurology, rather than a kind of technological cult or even technocratic civic religion, does not seem to be closed. In our opinion, the main vulnerability of transhumanism as a sociophilosophical paradigm is the elimination of the subject's problem and its physicality. By reducing the cognitive agent to the level of digital objects, transhumanism implicitly suggests a person's inevitable renunciation of his own nature. In this regard, the almost complete anthology of scientific texts on transhumanism (More, & Vita-More, 2013), even the breadth of its coverage of anthropological issues, reflected in the content, makes one wonder about the essence of the new synthesis that lies at the heart of the draft of transhumanism.
For example, in this collection of essays, there are sections devoted to the problems of human identity that practically bring bioethics beyond death (Obri de Hrei) or interpret a person's personal identity as a certain marker, information that can be formalized and functions as a digital document (J. Hughes). It is significant that the last, ninth, section of the book is dedicated to reflecting the ambivalence of the program of transhumanism as ideology. Authors (R. Kurtsveil, M. Mor, D. Brin, N. Bostrom, etc.) practically proceed from the collision of transhumanism and nature, describing the transition to nature of version 2.0, transformed, reworked as an inevitable consequence of civilizational development. It is not even the obvious consequences for the human picture of the world of the person's value orientations, his motivational sphere, worldviews that will cause the adoption of this state of things, but the fact that the lack of understanding from the point of view of philosophical anthropology is a "delayed death" of the fundamental civilizational instruction on the anthropological nature of civilization and culture. Therefore, it is practically possible to speak about the threat of another person's removal for the brackets of scientific and civilization processes, only this person will no longer be everywhere implicitly present and an almost omnipotent observer like the observer in Newton's classical physics. If the entire 20 th century with the formation of non-classical with the development of the non-classical and the emergence of post-non-classical science was dominated by the accentuation of the anthropic principle (in the ontological dimension -in its strongest version), then the 21 st century can eliminate a person by interpreting him as an element of the periphery of the computer world. Therefore, a certain skepticism and waiting strategy for contemporary philosophical thought concerning transhumanism and technologies of the sixth innovation wave raised by it on a shield and expectation in hopes for a "universal rule of mass resistance to newwave technologies" (Ozhevan, 2014) may not be sufficient as an adequate digital response for the challenges of a new digital future for humans. It seems to us that we need more stringent accentuation of to determine the problems of the anthropogenic in the culture and sphere of the cognitive. After all, it is obvious that, for example, the post-truth phenomenon is now being actively investigated in and, finally, the epistemological dimensions is deeply related to the picture of the world of transhumanism, in which a man loses the prerogative in generation of meaning.
Let us consider, in the light of the foregoing, the problem of cognition, which together with communication is one of the relevant aspects of human consciousness in the digital age. AI theory began with the realization that the processes of operating physical systems of symbols are similar in the minds of humans and computers, on which the computational or computer, the theory of consciousness is based. A well-known supporter of a similar point of view in philosophy of consciousness was J. Fodor with his modular model of consciousness. On the other hand, with his thought experiment "Chinese Room", J. Sorl emphasized the fundamental impossibility of machine thinking to operate not with the meanings of symbolic systems and individual symbols, but with the meanings generated by the information array outside the symbols themselves. Extremely schematizing, the human brain and consciousness operate like an analog computer, processing their content instantly as distributed and structurally, and according to the principle of an analog signal -by Gaussian, while the computer works with discrete packets of information in accordance with an algorithm. In addition, a general interpretation of K. Gödel's well-known theorem on the incompleteness of formal systems indicates the impossibility of achieving "a perfectly accurate (complete and consistent) scientific explanation of being based on mathematical discourse. In this regard, mathematics and natural science based on it, acquires the humanitarian status in addition to "exact" one" (Gukhman, 2018, p. 179). This is because the modern philosophy of information seeks to substantiate the possibility for artificial intelligence to circumvent the boundaries of formalizing knowledge, and finally explain to it the possibility of working with human meanings. But do not forget that at the same time it can mean the replacement of these meanings or manipulation of them.
The specificity of human understanding relies on the symbolic modus of generating meaning (when a symbol is interpreted not as a simple sign in a mathematical formula system but as a point of system singularity, "a limit of boundaries" and a marker of specific semantic reality (Kretov, & Kretova, 2018). Binary logic in programming languages or the limited value scale of formal and mathematical logic is destroyed within the framework of human discourse, a vivid example of which is human speech in general, and in the philosophy of the twentieth century, for example, the paradigm of dialogical philosophy. Currently, in PI in the twenties century, there is a direct allusion to Kant's distinction between the human brain and mind, with its reference to transcendence. Pythagoras's belief that the world is a number, reflected in the last major project of language formalization in the twentieth century, Wittgenstein, superimposed on the scientific discourse of the philosophy of information, finds out its insufficiency. A challenge arises for a new practical philosophy. The paradigm of transhumanism seeks to hold this lacuna.
In contemporary philosophy of information an example of finding a balance between PI and practical philosophy, and accordingly the problem of philosophical anthropology, in our opinion, is the specificity and antithetical approaches of R. Kapurro and L. Floridi. If for R. Kapurro the main task is to substantiate the foundations of the theory of digital ontology, then he solves the issues of practical philosophy, anthropological and ethical through the category of "ethos" and "being-in-the-world with others". Thus, the infosphere arises as a projection of the human world and acquires in addition to the ontic and ontological dimension in the Heidegger sense. L. Floridi, on the other hand, assumes that information ethics is part of environmental ethics, as it is generally revealed in the interaction of computers, information networks and people. If the axiological criterion is decisive for the integration of information technology and information systems into the human world (Lebenswelt, E. Husserl) and the environment (Umwelt), the latter, although they acquire ontological status, but are interpreted in a purely instrumental way, as extension modules for the concept of the external environment interpreted as informational one. L. Floridi (2012) in the article "Turing's three philosophical lessons and the philosophy of information" compares the influence of information technology and the information environment on the development of philosophy with innovation in the economy: Philosophy flourishes by constantly re-engineering itself. Nowadays, its pulling force of innovation is represented by the world of information, computation and communication phenomena, their corresponding sciences and technologies, and the new environments, social life, as well as the existential, cultural, economic and educational issues that they are bringing about. (Floridi, 2012, p. 3541) So, for Floridi the information environment as a whole can acquire the ontological dimension only, while for Capurro, the ontologically acting relationship and interaction between the elements of the whole is an ontologizing factor of the superadditivity of the whole. Continuing the thought, it should be noted that the possibility of ontologizing information and information environment of a person indicates that they are part of the human life and dependent primarily on human cognition and the picture of the world, for the foundation of which information is a necessary basis, but a boundary condition is still a specific person as integrity, taken in all its attributes. That is, the absolutization of the digital aspects of communication and cognition within a transhumanist approach seems to us incorrect.
In the context of cognitive and discursive-speaking issues, the concept of "cognitive closure" in contemporary philosophy of consciousness is currently relevant. We are talking about the ability of consciousness within the psyche to formulate and ask questions beyond the possibility of answering it. It is easy to see that it is almost again a Kantian transcendental question. At a deeper level, this term of cognitive psychology and philosophy of consciousness signifies the inability within the framework of consciousness of even formulating and asking questions that, together with the answers to them, lie far beyond the human cognitive horizon. In philosophical explications of transhumanism, one of the options for overcoming such a situation is abandon of a person, that is, the transition to "trans-" and post-human, an attempt to "smear" man as an electron in an electronic cloud on an imaginary scale rationally accessible and inaccessible. Similar attempts to cross the boundary between transcendental and transcendent are inherent, for example, to modern speculative realism and object-oriented ontology within it (K. Meiiasu, H. Harman). It is now about overcoming the limited cognitive abilities of individuals within the broad context of digital communication and interaction which, according to transhumanism, has ensured the exponential growth of human knowledge in the new age. An illustration may be the creation of "libraries of people" when bioethics and information ethics problematize the correlation of a person and a document in accordance with the project of creating biobanks of people. If this is about the fact that information necessarily acquires the characteristics of a message in R. Kapurro's "message society" (Saldanha, & Bozzetti, 2017), it is not difficult to come up with a holistic concept of anthropotechnical turn in the socio-cultural sphere of modern civilization (Vashkevich, & Dobrodum, 2018).
But cognitive optimism inherent in transhumanism sometimes (and most importantly does not exclude in principle) leads to the abandon of a person as the ultimate realization of the principle of nonanthropocentrism. The non-anthropocentric turn, the scandal of posthumanism theory, lies in its inability to decentralize human beings, but we continue to try to do so. Man has become a noticeable blind spot for many theorists seeking to pay attention to animals, plants and even things. A contemporary American researcher writes: "The human is a source of trouble for posthumanism. Committed to disturbing the opposition between human and nonhuman, posthumanist theory has tended to sideline the human from the scene of its theoretical engagements with otherness" (Peterson, 2017, p. 1). In our opinion, the problem is that, for example, the phenomenon of the "invisible gorilla" from the experiment of K. Chapris and D. Simons (1975), being a perfect illustration of the phenomenon of human oblivion and the human world, is also a figure of silence, an attempt at interesting cognitive mechanism of fixation of attention to hide the fundamental problem. Such an attitude to human inflation may well lead to a peculiar second-level illusion in modern humanities based on the cognitive sciences -a person accustoms himself to not notice, removing oneself from the equation, and this is done as a way of avoiding the utter impossibility of self-elimination by cognition (Fatkhutdinov, & Bazaluk, 2018). A person accepts auto-description of him/herself as a digital object. The man pretends to be not only naked but also an absent king, paraphrasing the famous fairy tale plot.
The non-anthropocentric turn has led to the emergence of a number of critical approaches that have broadened the landscape of the humanities.
Perceived by various fields of research, such as animal behavior studies, systems theory, actor-network theory, object-oriented ontology, and speculative realism, this turn… has carried out a broad theoretical reorientation. (Peterson, 2017, p. 23) In a situation where a person voluntarily renounces his/her own subjectivity, interpreting himself/herself as a specific nonanthropocentric object (H. Kharman) or as a cerebral object (M. Hazzanyha) (Vidal, & Ortega, 2017), perhaps one should return to the problematization of "the human condition in the world system of things … in both metaphysics and theory of cognition, ethics, and philosophical anthropology" (Rescher, 2018, p. 3). In our opinion, the philosophy of information, the problems of artificial intelligence and information and communication technologies can be integrated into the latest philosophical anthropology, related to practical philosophy. Post-classical science and the sciences of complexity, when considering a person, have to actualize the human horizon of meanings, and not beyond man, but through him. Moreover, this process should be associated with the understanding of the philosophical anthropology of modes and forms of interaction of information systems and man, and as part of them and as a completely autonomous agent of the generation of human meanings and the subject of social action.

Originality
The authors substantiate the ambivalent nature of the connection and interplay between the projects of the information philosophy and transhumanism, which come to life both through the formal aspects of human involvement in the digital communicative information environment and the speech-discursive practices of thinking on reality. The insufficiency of the transhumanism paradigm has been elucidated by reducing its human subjectivity. The specificity of the "cognitive closure" phenomenon in connection with the concept of transcendental interrogation is also considered.

Conclusions
As the analysis of the manifest issues shows, the question of the correlation between the philosophy of information and the project of transhumanism should be divided into several derivatives, among which the following should be especially emphasized: a) the nature of formal modes of interaction between the human and the digital information environment; b) the status of human consciousness and personality in the context of such interaction; c) transformation of cognitive activity and human communication within such interaction. As a result of the following considerations, we can draw the following conclusions.
First, the project of philosophy of information can testify to the emergence of the prerequisites for the transformation of philosophy in general and philosophical anthropology, in particular in the context of anthropocene and anthropotechnical turn in philosophy, science, and humanitarian knowledge. Analyzing the problem of information philosophy, taking into account the guideline to overcome the implicit dehumanization in the description of reality or nature 2.0, can avoid the disorienting logic of nonanthropocentrism, which implies a theoretical and practical collapse of understanding and description of the human world by science and philosophy. In turn, consideration of the current problems of the philosophy of information allows philosophical and anthropological studies to asquire existential, semantic, and axiological depths in the socio-cultural reality of the 21 st century. At this, the interaction between man and the digital environment is carried out on the basis of speech and language forms of discourse as the basic type of semiotic system -mediator. The status of human consciousness and personality can range from imperative (programming, cybernetics) to affiliate (social-communicative platforms) and dependent (user strategies, digital personality issues and manipulative strategies in the information space). Cognitive power of a person in the conditions of close interaction of theoretical constructions of information philosophy and philosophies and ideologies of transhumanism, within the scientific and mass consciousness, in addition to the traditional forms of interaction with instruments and equipment and mathematical and symbolic constructions, can be expressed and take the form of mainly speech and language discourse. This transformation of the "linguistic turn" is due to the fact that live speech is not formalized within digital communication models, since speech ontologizes a person beyond scientific and any other verbal descriptors.
Secondly, considering the initial provisions of transhumanism as a philosophical and sociocultural project, as well as ideology, in correlation with the philosophy of information, let suggest a metaphysical insufficiency (or vice versa, complete metaphysical character with negative connotations) in the sense that it is rooted in philosophical tradition of pragmatism and behaviorism make it difficult to form philosophical grounds for the concept of man. It is about imagining a new person and describing their capabilities and behavior, beyond analyzing their nature. Information philosophy and transhumanism together capture the intents of the development of the info-and technosphere of mankind, but transhumanism appears rather as a futurological ideology, a civil religion, appealing to the psycho-emotional sphere of man, while the philosophy of information seeks to clarify the rationality of a person.
And third, philosophical anthropology naturally integrates the problematic field of philosophy of information and transhumanism, analyzing the problems of neurophilosophy, neurocybernetics, cybernetics, bioethics, philosophy of consciousness, cognitive psychology and linguistics, conceptology, to, and at the same time, beyond all its hypothetical technogenic transformations.