THE EXISTENTIAL AND THE SPIRITUAL IN THE EXISTENTIAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF G. MARCEL AND E. MINKOWSKI

Purpose. To examine the existential anthropology of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski, in order to demonstrate the necessity of distinguishing the universal-spiritual, as human in human being, apart from the individual-existential in him, and to reveal the hierarchical correlation of biosocial, existential and spiritual spheres in personality.

Theoretical basis. Within existential philosophy the author differentiates two separate traditions and proceeds from the insufficiency of the distinction of existential sphere, proposed by phenomenological tradition, showing the necessity of its correlation with the spiritual sphere as a sphere of humanity, proposed by non-phenomenological tradition of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski.

Originality. The author presents the anthropological conception of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski, in which human personality is understood as unity of individual-existential and universal-spiritual, which requires a special trans-empirical field of culture, which contains senses, images and symbols of humanity. Also, the author presents the recent developments of existential thinkers in distinguishing existential and spiritual dimensions, both not reducible to the physical and social dimensions.

Conclusions. In both existential traditions, the specifically human was founded as a trans-biological and trans-social phenomenon, which appears as indefinable and non-predetermined. But in first tradition (M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre), humanity is understood as an existence, as a unique individuality, "project", variant of humanity, equivalent to other variants, and universal is understood as a community of human condition in the world. While in the second tradition (G. Marcel, E. Minkowski, also V. Frankl), the universal is understood as spiritual. Thus, horizontal level of our private existence, as the process of movement from birth to death, is supplemented by vertical of human, universal ideals and images. Humanity appears as a task, on the way to which human being transcends beyond the limits of his individual "self" to the "super-individual", through inclusion into spiritual community, into universal culture.

Keywords: humanity; existential reality; spirituality; being; existence; personality

Introduction

French philosophers A. Piette, M. Jackson are currently working on the creation of "existential anthropology", as an empirical-theoretical science that studies human being in his individuality and singularity. But such one-sided approach would lead us to a "radical empiricism", where the human is a completely situational being, a unique set of external manifestations, gestures, spontaneous acts, "radically different" from the other. Indeed, each human being is unique. This uniqueness of individuality was defended by existentialists, who distinguished existence ("Existenz") as a special trans-biological and trans-social dimension, in which the existence as individuality is solely possible. However, our thesis is that humanity as universal cannot be based at the level of existence, without a certain trans-empirical dimension, which, in relation to the horizontal of the existence of the particular individual, is a vertical of universal human senses and values. In the existential philosophy of M. Heidegger and J.-P. Sartre, the issue of the human in human being was solved on the level of existence, without correlation with the transcendent dimension. We will show what solution of that issue is proposed by G. Marcel and E. Minkowski, as representatives of another existential tradition (as well as including other like-minded existential thinkers). The "existential anthropology" of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski will be presented, in which each personality is understood as a unique unity of the individual-existential and universal-spiritual, incarnated in him.
Purpose

The purpose of the article, basing on existential anthropology of G. Marcel, E. Minkowski, and also V. Frankl and E. van Deurzen, is to show the necessity of distinguishing the biosocial, existential and spiritual spheres in human personality and to distinguish the universal-spiritual, as human in human being, apart from the individual-existential in him.

Statement of basic materials

Nowadays French philosophers A. Piette, M. Jackson are actively developing "existential anthropology", as an empirical-theoretical examination of singularity in individuals:

The extremely high level of individuation in humans is a major anthropological fact (and has been… for tens of thousands of years of hominisation). Other living species do not possess it to such a high degree, to the level that defines consciousness of the self, awareness of existing as singular, regardless of any psychological, social or cultural slant that could be placed on that individuality. It is oxymoronic of anthropology as the science of human beings to homogenise these units socioculturally, since the characteristic feature of existence is that it is implacably private and singular. …an anthropology that sets out to be anthropo-focused – an individuology – cannot separate an action, connection or experience from the person who performs or experiences it. (Piette, 2015, p. 3)

According to A. Piette:

My ideal would be this: leave it up to the social sciences… the study of social and cultural phenomena, and grant existential anthropology the specificity of being the empirical and theoretical science of human beings, separated individuals, their living, existent, present singularities with all their particularities, which are of course also social and cultural, but not only. In
order to be general, this anthropology would compare individuals with one another, with other existing entities. (Piette, 2016, p. 48)

Indeed, each person’s life is unique, but at the same time it is human. The focus on the unique, on the details of life of individuality (acts, gestures, words, behaviour in situations), contrary to the universal as "specifically human" could turn into a "radical empiricism": «In ordinary life as well: seized in its spontaneous immediacy, our daily life is often abstract, for lack of reference to some global sense. The isolated "individual" is necessarily "abstract". Nothing more abstract is disastrous, therefore, than a short-term pragmatism, "utopia of the immediate"» (De Koninck, 2015, p. 8), (my translation from French, A. Z.).

The metaphysical space, in which the universal human essence was defined, was deconstructed by postmodern philosophers. Existentialists were among the first to conclude that there was no given, ready-made human essence. However, within existential philosophy there are two ways concerning the humanity explanation. Representatives of the "phenomenological" tradition of existential philosophy i.e., M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre, S. de Beauvoir, M. Merleau-Ponty raise the question of universally human not as a universal "essence" that resides "inside", but as a universal position of human being in the world, where everyone is doomed to abandonment, freedom of choice, alienation and loneliness. M. Heidegger in the "Letter on Humanism" defines human being as an existence ("Existenz"), understanding it not as essence, but as an act of transcending out of oneself into the "lighting/clearing" ("Lichtung") of Being. J.-P. Sartre in his early works "Existentialism is a humanism" and "Being and Nothingness" declares the dualism of external and internal as non-existent and reduces the inner (essence) to the outer (existence). Humanity is understood by him as an individual "project", and each human being is a creator of his humanity, and legislator of human values. Thus, each individual life is a "version of humanity", equivalent to any other. The question of the measure: whether this or that variant is true or false is not posed, as in that coordinate system there is no vertical of the universal, which indicates an ideal "top" and "bottom", with which human being could correlate his particular life. On the horizontal, only movement from past to future is possible as a process of continuous change, ending with death, "being-toward-death" (M. Heidegger). There is no vertical, transcendent, which would set the direction for this movement.

G. Marcel and E. Minkowski, representatives of another, "non-phenomenological" existential tradition, proposed an alternative basis of humanity in their "existential anthropology". That term we find in the texts by Minkowski’s follower J. Gabel, who classifies such existential psychiatrists as L. Binswanger, M. Boss, I. A. Caruso, V. E. von Gebssattel, R. Bilz, G. Benedetti and E. Minkowski as the school of "existential anthropology". Binswanger himself calls his approach "phenomenological anthropology". But if he, like Boss, based it on the philosophy of Heidegger (who "anthropologized" phenomenology of Husserl), Minkowski developed his phenomenological psychiatry, based on philosophy of Bergson and anthropologized it. The same anthropologization was carried out by the follower of Bergson G. Marcel in his existential philosophy. As we have already pointed out, the feature of "existential anthropology" of Marcel and Minkowski is the correlation of the individual-existential with the universal-spiritual as human in human being, where the personality is understood as their dynamic, creative and unique unity.

First, we shall consider, how Marcel understands the existential dimension. According to Marcel, when speaking of the human being, it is necessary to single out a special reality that is located between transcendental (metaphysical, spiritual) and social (empirical)
worlds. This human reality is located in the middle, between them, and is not reducible to either of them:

My body or my life, treated as subsisting realities, are situated in a zone of experience, say symbolically in an intermediate historical phase, between the world, where individual is still the bearer of certain mysterious energies, cosmic or spiritual, the transcendence of which he obscurely feels himself – and a socialized world, perhaps it should even be called urbanized, where the sense of the original is more and more obliterated, and the accent, on the contrary, is put more and more strongly on the function to be fulfilled in a certain economy, that is both abstract and tyrannical. (Marcel, 1967, p. 146) (my translation from French, A. Z.)

In this human reality, social and spiritual factors unite in a unique unity. But alone, neither the space of spirit, nor the space of society, nor other "spaces" have a "reality" outside and beyond me as an existing subject ("l’existent"). Of course, social world exists objectively, independently of me, as an "environment" of my existence. But the way I live in it, and do I live only in it, or correlate it with the spiritual world – depends entirely on me.

Contemporary existential thinkers introduce the term "existential reality" (Cooper, 2017), "reality of life", "human reality" (Deurzen, 2010), in order not to leave doubt that they mean the reality of my life, and not the reality "in general" (reality of facts, events, social, natural environment, verified empirical reality of science).

From our point of view, it is even better to speak of an "existential view on reality", using G. Marcel’s term, in order to avoid the objectification of existential reality. Then it becomes clear that only human being opens the world either as an empirical reality, or as an existential one – depending from his view, his attitude.

E. Husserl called the view on reality as on set of external objects, things – a "natural attitude", which prevails in science and in everyday life. However, by reducing natural scientific concepts, which substitute phenomena for themselves, Husserl does not reduce the very attitude of the Observer, the detached viewer, who in relation to the world places himself "out" and "above" it. The existential view on reality, according to Marcel, is a view not of the observer or user, but of the participant.

Marcel contrasts "homo particeps" as participative human, and "homo spectans" as observer, spectator: "In distinguishing between homo spectans and homo particeps, I wanted to put my emphasis on the fact that in the latter case there is self-commitment, and in the former there is not." (Marcel, 1964, p. 122). Other type of human life-attitude, opposite to participative, is technical attitude. Marcel reserves: "the privilege of universality in thinking to scientists or technicians whose method is that of a series of operations which can be carried out by anybody else in
the world who is placed in the same setting and can make use of similar tools" (Marcel, 1964, p. 9). In this technical attitude, in which the subject is opposed to the object, intending to subordinate and change it with the help of tools, dominates a "first", analytic reflexion, aimed at solving problems. Both the technician and the spectator are located on the surface of everyday practice, in the "external" objective world, and are led by the attitude of possession, utilization, mastery over reality. In the "Concrete approaches to investigating the Ontological Mystery" Marcel calls an individual with such an attitude the "aggregate of functions": "The individual tends to consider him or herself, and likewise tends to appear to others, as merely an agglomeration of functions… the individual has been inclined increasingly to regard him or herself as merely an aggregate of functions whose hierarchical order appears problematic" (Marcel, 1998, p. 173). Namely: of vital functions (in materialistic and Freudian understanding), social functions (of consumer, producer, citizen), psychological functions ("too often interpreted either in terms of vital functions or in terms of social functions" (Marcel, 1998, p. 173)), psycho-organic (sleep, leisure, relaxation). "As for death, from this objective and functional point of view it appears only as ceasing to function, falling into total uselessness, becoming sheer waste to be discarded" (Marcel, 1998, p. 174).

In the contemporary individual: "any sense of being or the ontological is lacking", he "has lost all consciousness of having had any such dimension to their lives. This is the way most modern men and women are, and if a need for a sense of being affects them at all, it is only in a muted way, as some vague uneasiness" (Marcel, 1998, p. 172).

Along with participative attitude, Marcel opposes to spectator’s and functional attitude, by which he understands not only scientific position, but indifference of the inhabitant, to whom even war is a "stimulating spectacle", one more attitude – the contemplative attitude:

Contemplation utterly excludes curiosity: which is to say, in other words, that contemplation is not orientated towards the future. …contemplation is a possibility only for somebody who has made sure of his grip on reality; for somebody who floats on the surface of reality, or who, as it were, skims over the thin ice of that surface on skates, for the amateur or the dilettante, the contemplative act is inconceivable. And we can already divine that the ascesis, the discipline of the body, which in all ages and for all religions has been held necessary if the soul is to be made capable of contemplation, amounts precisely to a set of steps which, to certain spirits, appear simply as having to be taken, if the soul is to strengthen its grip on the real. We may conclude from all this, and it is a very important conclusion, that contemplation, in so far as it cannot be simply equated with the specta-
tor’s attitude and in a deep sense is even at the opposite pole from that attitude, must be considered as a mode of participation, and even as one of participation’s most intimate modes. (Marcel, 1964, p. 123)

Both the technical attitude, proceeding from the principle of "greatest utility" in mastering empirical world, and the attitude of a spectator-player, who formally performs social functions, oppose the attitude of the participant and contemplator, to whom the being is only accessible.

As we see, there are two ways of attitude to reality: as to the "objective" world of objects, which opens to me as to the observer-spectator, and as to the reality of my being, which opens to me as to participant. This is not about two realities that exist on their own (which again would mean the "objective" existence of these realities, independent of a particular human being), but about two attitudes: in the first I’m a spectator, in the second – a participant in the "Mystery of Being". This participative attitude can be called existential.

As we see, Marcel is building up his existential anthropology, in which the external social shell and the inner exiting subject are contrasted. G. Mead called them "I" and "Me", meaning "I" and my social "role". Marcel calls this inner subject: "personality", "spiritual organism", opposing them to "ego" and "individual".

Marcel uses the term "existential indices" in his first work "Existence and objectivity", understanding it as existential "humus" of thought, which precedes knowledge. However, he will come to conclusion, that to base only existential, as subjective, concrete and individual – as opposed to the objective, abstract, and universal, – is not enough. Questioning: "what am I?", Marcel will come to the fact that I am not identical to my body or my life:

It is in the womb of recollection that I take a position – or more exactly that I put myself in a state that allows me to take a stand – with regard to my life. I withdraw from it in some way, but not as the pure knowing subject; in this retreat I bring with me what I am and what my life perhaps is not. Here we perceive the distance between my being and my life. I am not my life, and if I am able to judge my life – a fact I cannot deny without falling into a radical skepticism that is nothing more than despair – it is on the condition that I can first of all encounter myself within recollection that is beyond all possible judgments, and, I will add, beyond any possible representation. (Marcel, 1998, p. 182)
There is something beyond my particular life, to where I am capable to transcend and from where I am capable to rethink my life. What is that "place", transcendent to life?

Marcel differentiates life and being: "On a certain level, one’s being and one’s life do not coincide; my life, and by refraction every life, can appear to me as forever inadequate to something that I carry within me, something that in some sense I am, which, however, reality seems to resist and exclude" (Marcel, 1998, p. 183). There is something greater in me, something possible, hidden, than what is shown and given. In this sense, existence is only a visible surface layer of the revealed, ready-made, and within the framework of existence "as it is" there is nothing that calls for change, transformation, rise to something greater.

There is something more than myself, my finite body, life and "I", something "super-individual". This something penetrates me, to the extent that I am "penetrable", open, accessible ("disponible") to him. And here it is necessary to turn to another dimension. In the work "Problematic Man" he will call this particular dimension "transcendent".

The being of Marcel, unlike the being of Heidegger, is metaphysical. It can be said, that Marcel builds an opposition between existence and being, where being is transcendent to existence. "This attempt to situate the principles of prima philosophia in the great phenomena of personal life goes hand in hand with the recognition of its rootedness in the sacred, transcendent" (Veto, 2015, p. 41), (my translation from French, A. Z.). But, again, there is no "objective being" as Plato’s "sky of ideas" or metaphysical space. The existence of my body is already there, given objectively, as well as my social function. However, there is no being as yet. It can only possibly be, and only as my being, which I struggle to reach with all my strength, transcending my private existence:

There must be – or there must have been – being; everything cannot be finally reduced to the interplay of successive and inconsistent appearances – this word inconsistent is essential – or, as Shakespeare has phrased it "a tale told by an idiot". I aspire avidly to participate in some way in this being, and perhaps this exigency itself is already a degree of participation, no matter how rudimentary. (Marcel, 1998, p. 175)

Access to being, as we have already indicated, is opened through a participative position and in contemplation. The necessary moment of contemplation is attentiveness and recollection, which is a second reflection", that withdraws the alienation of person from being, occurred in the "first reflection": "This second reflection lets recollection become self-conscious to the extent that recollection can be thought" (Marcel, 1998, p.183). Recollection is the act of regaining myself, of "collecting myself as a unity", of returning to the existential self, without which it is impossible to return to being:

No ontology is possible, that is to say, no apprehending of the ontological mystery to any degree whatsoever, except for a being who is capable of recollecting him or herself – and by this to bear witness to the fact that he
or she is not purely and simply a living thing, a creature thrown into life
with no hold on it. (Marcel, 1998, p. 181)

Recollection is a way of transcending from existence to being.
Eugene Minkowski, a founder of phenomenological psychiatry in France and a friend of
Marcel, also turns to the sphere of the transcendent as spiritual. But he places both the existential
and spiritual spheres – within the human being. Minkowski understands the spiritual sphere as:
"a sphere of spiritual communion with something that surpasses me and guides me but which,
irrational in its essence, cannot be detached from me or be made to be anything more precise"

Minkowski speaks of this sphere as a "approbative murmur" of invisible community of the
most human people who ever lived, which prompts us at the decisive moment a true act that will
not be my private, but universal, "ethical act", realizing the "most human" in us:

If through ethical action I should reach the most elevated summit acces-
sible to man, I should never be isolated there but would be in the midst of
my peers, ideal and unattainable figures… who nonetheless constitute the
ideal prototype of society. In ethical action I am the supreme judge, but
this judgment that I feel bursting forth in me is accompanied by an ap-
probative murmur coming from an innumerable, impersonal, and invisi-
ble crowd, as if it were the expression of a unanimous vote resulting from
an ideal plebiscite. (Minkowski, 1970, p. 128)

He explains that this spiritual sphere can be called a "superego", not in the Freudian sense, but
in the sense of the power that guides me:

This super individual factor in spite of its power not only does not de-
stroy or annihilate my own person but is shown to be its true basis. In
particularly serious circumstances in life, knowing that it is I who makes
the decision, don’t I have in my conscience the feeling of being guided
by a force that surpasses me? (Minkowski, 1970, p. 49)

This is close to the V. Frankl’s concept of "unconscious spirituality" as the voice of con-
science. At the same time, speaking about good and evil, he explains:
It is not just a question of the simple confrontation of the two forces which, situated on the same level, attempt to battle each other. Plane geometry is not sufficient here. For, when we live a conflict of this order, we do not simply feel buffeted between two opposed poles. Moreover we feel a movement, a movement which we can designate by the words "rise" and "fall". There seems to be a movement of oscillating levels which happens at the same time. In other words, it is not simply a question of making a choice and of going either left or right. We feel besides, and in an immediate manner, that in engaging ourselves in one of the two directions we are elevated, while, on the contrary, in choosing the other we can only fall. (Minkowski, 1970, p. 114)

We see that Minkowski introduces the vertical, the top and bottom, with which human being correlates his choice. However, one does not do it rationally, weighing pros and cons, predicting the consequences, as he does in everyday practice:

Here there is no choice since, in reality, the choice is already made. One does not choose reasonably between the good and the bad. There is no decision, for either I succumb and become swept away and fallen or I feel a force bursting from the depths of my being which greatly surpasses me. As for the consequences, ethical action fundamentally foresees none. It does not involve any consequence unless it is that which opens all of the future before us and allows us to embrace, in the space of an instant, a flash of the eye, all the grandeur, all the value, all the wealth of life. (Minkowski, 1970, p. 106)

Rising above ourselves, we can receive an unguaranteed and unintended gift – a "moment of being", an instant in which "all time" is folded.
It would seem that Sartre understands the process of my existence in a similar way: as transcendence, as going beyond the limits of the given, as "elan towards..." ("élan vers..."). The ellipsis means: the final destination is unknown, because there is no ready ideal of humanity. The human being constitutes, creates it himself, he himself is the legislator of human values. Meanwhile, the expression "elan towards...", which first appears in my personal impetus I go beyond myself on the road towards the ideal of humanity, which is inexpressible with concepts, never completely known, but could be only intuitively presented. The ellipsis means here: "unrationalizable absolute". Within the framework of my individual life, I transcend from the past towards the future through my acts, expectations, desires and hopes. But outside the perspective of eternity, which lies beyond the horizon of my private future – my existence will be meaningless, a simple set of events, pleasures, defeats and victories and other individual things:

I do not feel myself to be only the child of my time, of my era, a feeling which gives a relative character to all that I do and all that I think; but before anything else I feel that I am the child of time, of becoming in general, and it is this which makes the value that I attempt to realize in life absolute. I carry in me the notion of a universal destiny.

(Minkowski, 1970, p. 50)

If I would create in myself and my actions something universal, I can believe that I would become part of the spiritual community of mankind and deserve immortality. Not the "physical immortality" of my soul in some other world. According to Minkowski, everything that is in me only private and individual, my very self, will die. Only the accomplished super-individual will remain. Will remain, let us say, in culture.

The sphere of existential depth Minkowski understands as follows: "When, through my personal elan, I affirm myself in life, I see this elan bursting forth from a profound and inward source of my being in order to be crystallized finally in the accomplished act at the surface. Becoming seems now to penetrate the ego, hollowing out there in depth a kind of subterranean gallery and to form there a source, unknown but powerful, losing itself, so to speak, beyond the limits of the ego. The dimension in depth of the ego thus surges before our eyes. This depth is not like a well whose bottom could never be reached. No, there is only something infinitely moving and living there, something which palpitates at the base of our being, which gives depth to our being. There is something elusive which always escapes the curious looks of knowledge; fleeing, it seems to go beyond the ego, yet we feel it to be the true source of our life. Taken in itself, this depth appears to have something impersonal in it; however, it is, above all, when we strive to give to the world what is most personal in us that we feel our elan coming from the depths of our being. This depth – and it is scarcely necessary to say it once again – belongs much more to becoming than to being. Consequently, we have preferred to speak of the dimension (going) in depth rather than simply "depth" (Minkowski, 1970, p. 52). Behind all elements of our mental life (perception, feelings, representations, volitions), behind all manifestations and acts..."
there is always something that lies "behind" them, "in depth": "the very source of life". As we see, people are co-natural to each other not only on the spiritual, but also on the vital level, in which we are all rooted.

In a similar way a like-minded existential thinker V. Frankl also differs psychosomatic and spiritual spheres within human personality:

Before, we stated that the line between the spiritual – as the human in human being – and the instinctual cannot be drawn sharply enough. In fact we may conceive of it as an ontological hiatus that separates the two fundamentally distinct regions within the total structure of the human being. On one side is existence, and on the other side is whatever belongs to facticity: Whereas existence, according to our definition, is in essence spiritual, facticity contains somatic and psychic "facts", the physiological as well as the psychological. And whereas the line between existence and facticity, that ontological hiatus, must be drawn as sharply as possible, within the realm of facticity the line between the somatic and the psychic cannot be drawn clearly. (Frankl, 2000, p. 33)

As for the opposition "conscious-unconscious" in Frankl’s conception there is place to opposition "spiritual existence versus psychophysical facticity".

Here we can argue whether our existence is already "spiritual" and "already" human. According to Minkowski, a "second birth" is required as the birth not as a body, but as a spirit. The views of like-minded existential thinkers G. Marcel, E. Minkowski, V. Frankl, K. Jaspers, P. Tillich coincide in the point that the human is spiritual. And, to the extent that individual is human, he is spiritual and his existence is the embodiment of the content of his spirit. The above-mentioned thinkers also understand the wholeness of the personality in a similar way: as the unity of spiritual and psycho-somatic (Frankl), of organo-psychical and anthropo-cosmical (Minkowski), of spirit and vitality (Tillich), of Existenz and the Reason (Jaspers), as the incarnation of the spirit in the body (Marcel). It is not a question of contrasting these two spheres as in the Descartes’ mind-body dualism, but in emphasizing the necessity of a "second floor", of non-objective, spiritual dimension in a personality, that is not "given" initially, from birth, but whose evolution proceeds throughout life through initiation into the universal culture. According to Minkowski, in this spiritual evolution, each human being acts as a link in the continuous chain of human becoming. In this case, the mentioned thinkers do not objectivize the transcendent dimension. It does not exist in a ready-made form, like a certain space of ideals, but is in constant process of becoming, capturing images of the human in human being.
Other existential thinkers also distinguish several "dimensions" or levels of human existence. L. Binswanger distinguished: Umwelt (the world of nature), Mitwelt (the world of relationships with others) and Eigenwelt (the inner world). E. van Deurzen, one of the founders of existential therapy in Great Britain, a follower of R. D. Laing, added to the worlds of L. Binswanger the fourth world: Uberwelt (the spiritual world) – the world of ideals, meanings, values and beliefs. E. van Deurzen calls those worlds "the four dimensions of existence". These dimensions are also comparable to the four "regions of reality" of Husserl: "material", "animate organism", "psychological" and "communities". (Bennett, & Deurzen, 2017, p. 248).

According to E. van Deurzen:

"Crudely speaking, we are involved in a four-dimensional force field at all times… First, we are regulated by physical, biological, natural forces. We are, second, inserted into a social, cultural network. Third, we are regulated by our own personality, character and mental processes. Finally, we are modulated by our relationship to the overall framework of meaning through which we experience the world and make sense of it on an ideological or spiritual dimension. (Deurzen, 2010, p. 138)"

As we can see, dimensions are understood not as different "worlds" or environments, separated from each other. But as the force fields which influence us. In this case, the human being acts in them in different qualities. In the natural field the human being acts as a biological body, in the social field as a social organism, a carrier of the psyche and a performer of social roles and functions. The personal field, according to Deurzen, is the inner world, the world of relations with oneself. This is an inner, intimate circle of a human being, in which he does not function, but lives, cares, loves. At this level, people "also have the experience of an inner world, where they can retreat into a sense of personal privacy and intimacy and they can be more or less open or closed to that and in which they can move in time, by recollecting the past, focusing on the present or imagining and anticipating the future" (Deurzen, 2014, p. 77). Thus, the "lived time", described by Minkowski, as being in the life flux that flows from the past to the future, also occurs at this level.

In our opinion, this force field, located between the social and the spiritual, is the human "existential reality" located by Marcel between the social and transcendent worlds. Here human being acts no longer as an organism or a function, but as an "existential self" ("Existenz" in terms of Jaspers and Heidegger). Without this existential level, as a prerequisite, the following level would be also impossible: the spiritual level, on which human being acts not only as Existenz, but as a personality. Then the personality is not a separate force field, but a special quality in which human being acts on a higher, spiritual level. On the other hand, it would be a huge mistake to demarcate these dimensions or worlds, to say that human being lives and acts alternately as a biosocial organism, or as an existential self, or as a spiritual personality (one at a time). Our thesis is this: the spiritual level is not a given, but a task. From our birth, only biological level and the level of "pre-reflective" "spontaneity" (in terms of Sartre) are given to us. In the course
of socialization, the Ratio is forming in an individual, which is usually linked with the suppression of his spontaneity, down to its decrease. Further, the "inner world" of human being is forming above the biosocial level. Existence as a social function, as a role imposed from outside, can lead to the absence (formless or vanishing) of this inner world. Birth as a personality is a "second birth" (E. Minkowski), which is impossible outside the "sphere of spiritual community" (E. Minkowski), outside the field of culture (N. A. Kasavina). According to Kasavina, from existential experience, as mystery (according to Marcel), as experiences – human being needs to move on to its comprehension, ordering and value interpreting: "In order to unravel experience, he must turn to cultural archetypes, make sense of the experience" (Znakov, & Kasavina, 2018, p. 128), to correlate it with the "cultural dimension". In fact, its thesis coincides with our thesis of insufficiency of the existential dimension, on which we experience an immediate existential contact with the world, and the need of correlation of our Existenz with spiritual dimension, in which we can solely acquire our wholeness as a spirit, incarnated in our flesh and Existenz. It must be emphasized, that with the appearance of the spirit, all "lower" levels are spiritualized. In the course of incarnation, the spirit, penetrating our flesh and Existenz, subordinates them, forming a hierarchy. Without this hierarchy, the personal unity of the body-existenz-spirit would be impossible.

Originality

The author presents the concept of personality of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski, understood as the unity of the individual-existential and universal-spiritual in human being. Based on their existential anthropology, the author substantiates the necessity of distinguishing the biosocial, existential and spiritual spheres within human personality and their hierarchical relationship. Author also indicates the need for a special trans-empirical field of culture, containing images and symbols of humanity.

Conclusions

One of contemporary most unsolved problems is the problem of human in human being. In postmodern philosophy this problem was annulled together with the metaphysical space containing "essences" and "universals". The spiritual situation of our time can truly be called an "anthropological catastrophe" (M. K. Mamardashvili), the triumph of a "singular", random, "divided subject", existing on the social empirical surface and disintegrating into many roles and functions. In the existential anthropology of Heidegger and Sartre humanity was associated with existence as a special existential sphere, into which human being can "hide" from the society, defend his freedom, uniqueness and individuality. However, at the level of existence, it is impossible to base the "specifically human" in us, as that which connects us with others. It is only possible to describe the universality of our existential situation, like the situation of finitude, loneliness, abandonment, freedom of choice, senselessness and other existential givens of human destiny. They are only the initial data, the coordinates of the beginning of the path, common to all. The path of human being can be either a path of unique individuality, creating oneself from "nothing", at one’s own risk, as a unique "project", a version of humanity, that is equivalent to any other. Or it can be a path to the maximal accomplishment of oneself as a human, included into the universal culture, which contains the images and ideals of humanity, all versions of their embodiment. In the existential anthropology of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski, as well as in the one of V. Frankl, the universal is understood as spiritual. Therefore, by definition, the "spirit" is indefinable, indescribable in objective definitions and its description becomes an almost insoluble task. It
is impossible not to see, that the writings of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski essentially concretize understanding of human spirituality. In the end, we came to the fact that the source of it should be sought in the universal human culture. Existential philosophy must unite with existential cultureology.

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АНТРОПОЛОГІЧНА ПРОБЛЕМАТИКА В ІСТОРІЇ ФІЛОСОФІЇ


А. С. ЗІНЕВИЧ

1* Інститут філософії ім. Г. С. Сковороди, Національна академія наук України (Київ, Україна), ел. пошта niokazin@yahoo.com, ORCID 0000-0003-4371-1198

ЕКЗИСТЕНЦІЙНЕ Й ДУХОВНЕ В ЕКЗИСТЕНЦІЙНІЙ АНТРОПОЛОГІЇ Г. МАРСЕЛЯ І Є. МІНКОВСЬКОГО

Мета. Спираючись на екзистенціальну антропологію Г. Марселя і Є. Минковського, показати необхідність виділення в людині крім індивідуально-екзистенціального – універсально-духовного як людського в людині й розкрити ієрархічне співвідношення біосоціальної, екзистенційної й духовної сфери особистості.

Теоретичний базис. Автор розрізняє усередині екзистенціальної філософії дві традиції і виходить із недостатності виділення екзистенційної сфери, запропонованої феноменологічною традицією, і необхідності співвіднесення її з духовною сферою як сферою людського в людині, запропонованої нефеноменологічною традицією Г. Марселя і Є. Минковського.

Наукова новизна. Автором представлена антропологічна концепція Г. Марселя і Є. Минковського, у якій людина розуміється як єдність індивідуально-екзистенціального й універсально-духовного в людині, та позначена необхідність особливого транс-емпірічного смислового поля культури, що містить образи і символи людиної. Також розглянуті останні розробки екзистенціальних мислителів в обґрунтуванні екзистенційного й духовного вимірів, як таких, що не зводяться до фізичного й соціального.

Висновки. В обох екзистенціальних традиціях специфічно людське обґрунтовалося як трансбіологічне й транссоціальне. В обох традиціях людяність постає як не задана, заздалегідь не визначена. Але в першій традиції (М. Гайдеггер, Ж.-П. Сартр) людяність розуміється як екзистенція, як неповторна індивідуальність, унікальний “проект”, варіант людянісності, рівноцінний іншим варіантам, а універсальний розуміється як спільність положення людини в світі. Тоді як у другій традиції (Г. Марсель і Є. Минковський, також В. Франкл), загальнолюдське розуміється як духовне. Таким чином, горизонтальний рівень нашого час-ткового існування, як процесу руху від народження до смерті, – доповнюється вертикально загальнолюдськими, універсальними ідеалами і образами, з якими людина співвідносить своє приватне існування. Здійснення себе як людини виявляється можливим лише через включення в духовну спільність, у загальнолюдську культуру.

Ключові слова: екзистенція; духовність; буття; існування; людяність; особистість

А. С. ЗІНЕВИЧ

1* Інститут філософії ім. Г. С. Сковороди, Національна академія наук України (Київ, Україна), ел. пошта niokazin@yahoo.com, ORCID 0000-0003-4371-1198

ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛЬНОЕ И ДУХОВНОЕ В ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛЬНОЙ АНТРОПОЛОГИИ Г. МАРСЕЛЯ И Е. МИНКОВСКОГО

Цель. Спираясь на экзистенциальную антропологию Г. Марселя и Е. Минковского, показать необходимость выделения кроме индивидуально-экзистенциального в человеке – универсально-духовного как человеческого в человеке и раскрыть иерархическое соотношение биосоциальной, экзистенциальной и духовной сфер личности.

Теоретический базис. Автор различает внутри экзистенциальной философии две традиции и исходит из недостаточности выделения экзистенциальной сферы, предложенной феноменологической традицией, и необходимости её соотнесения с духовной сферой как сферой человеческого в человеке, предложенной нефеноменологической традицией Г. Марселя и Е. Минковского.

Научная новизна. Автором представлена антропологическая концепция Г. Марселя и Е. Минковского, в которой человек понимается...
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