BODY AND SPACE RELATIONSHIP IN THE RESEARCH FIELD OF
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: BLUMENBERG’S
CRITICISM OF EDMUND HUSSERL’S "ANTHROPOLOGY PHOBIA"

Purpose. The article suggested for consideration is aimed at clarifying the shift in human perception from the spatial turn announced by Michel Foucault, to a performative turn. The performative turn has an anthropological footing. It is based on the all-round investigation of the body’s principal role for cultural existence, as a result of a reverse reaction to artificial conceptual gap between space and body, which basically means ignoring the embodiment theme. An example of such theoretical deformation was Edmund Husserl’s "anthropology phobia" revealed and thoroughly analysed by Hans Blumenberg in his critical works. Originality of the approach applied in this research, first and foremost, demonstrates not an abstract phenomenological conception as a theoretical construct, but a phenomenological activity itself, as well as practical work expressing antepredicative experience and solving the problems arising in this complicated process. Applying the Blumenberg’s analysis also allows to peep in the sidelined notes of Edmund Husserl himself, which, for their part, acquire special meaning in relation to such a practical (performative) turn. Conclusions show the following state of affairs demonstrated by the anthropological and performative shift towards the body theme: 1) absolutisation of space without mentioning its relation to body experience is unreasonable and groundless, like in Husserl’s "anthropology phobia"; 2) since the ground itself is a metaphorical anthropology basis, anthropology can reveal the structural conditions of perception due to thematic frontal of embodiment; 3) this gives anthropology some compensational features, to avoid false culture and nature dualism; 4) so, the space and body relationship is expressed by the Vehikel-phenomenon (transport phenomenon) of the body itself, by placing, arranging and depicting, and thus replacing something missing and unavailable for direct contemplation, by revealing the spatial infrastructure for object perception, creating the presence conditions and metaphorically marking the contemplation boundary; 5) the depicting arrangement (Darstellung) is at the same time a bodily performance, a play, staging and performing, which gives an aesthetic, poetic and emphatic impact on the use of philosophy language, in our case, on the way a phenomenology philosopher works with the language.

Keywords: performative turn; body; space; transport phenomenon; Husserl; Blumenberg; phenomenological anthropology; anthropology phobia

Introduction

In his report at the conference of the Architecture Research Society of March, 14, 1967, Michel Foucault characterised the modern age as an epoch of space:

The present age would rather be an epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity, we are in the epoch of contiguity, in the epoch of something close and distant, shoulder-to-shoulder and scattered.

I believe we are at the moment when the world is testing itself, at least as a great life developing through the time, as a network connecting the points and twisting its bundle. One could say for sure that ideological
conflicts activated by the polemic debates of today are heated up among
the devout descendants of the time and furious inhabitants of space.

(Foucault, 1994, p. 752)

Almost 40 years passed and Christoph Wulf (2008) in the introduction to his review paper "Anthropology. History, Culture, Philosophy" mentioned the unification of anthropological research (evolutionary research, philosophical anthropology, anthropological research in historical studies, cultural anthropology, historical anthropology) around the body as the main object of research (p. 9). What was going on at that period? And why did the space happen to come into strong relationship with the body? The first question is easier to answer: at that time period there appeared a performative turn in understanding culture. It marked the transition from purely hermeneutic (language-focused) understanding of culture, similarly to the text which needs theoretical knowledge to interpret the things already done, to a dramatised and executive cultural action requiring practical knowledge. Such culture performativity is impossible without the body (Wulf, 2008, p. 147). The second question is not so easy to answer. It needs thorough philosophical work, since there must be dismissed the doubts of occasional relationship between space and body. The rationale of this article is closely connected with this answer.

**Purpose**

There is no sense to consider in great detail the general discursive conditions of our appeal to the body. Of great importance is to demonstrate the complicated formation of philosophical thematisation of embodiment. All that is left to do is to clarify the basic research hypothesis that the spatial turn announced by Michel Foucault has its own reverse side – the theme of embodiment. However, this is impossible to achieve without analysing the principles of Husserl’s phenomenology research, in terms of which there first appears a continuous connection of space and body. This could be the basic answer to the question about the reason of shift of the humanitarian research from abstract spatiality to performativity based on embodiment, all the more so, because for us such a shift of scientific view looks like phenomenologisation of spatiality, inclusion in the primary bodily experience.

**Statement of basic materials**

If Michel Foucault discovers the "spatial" side of relationship between space and body, its reverse "bodily" side can be perceived through the phenomenology experience of Edmund Husserl. In this context, a key to penetrating into Husserl’s survey will be his well-grounded interpretation given by Hans Blumenberg (2002). This interpretation accounts for painstaking moments of a phenomenologist’s work (for example, Husserl’s work) as numerous sideline notes which express not only and not just dissatisfaction with his work but also express true phenomenological thought and energy. Moreover, Blumenberg states the basic features of phenomenological anthropology that, at first sight, conceptually contradicts Husserl’s vision of phenomenology and phenomenological reality which is to be pure and universal. It is the Husserl’s concept of life world that became an important step on the way to creating a phenomenological and anthropological project. Blumenberg wrote:
Phenomenologically, the "life world" is a concept opposite to the "objective" scientific world. However, there inevitably arises a question of preconditions for having the life world since it is the world of highest stability, like a fixed constant. Though, there can be obvious semantic differences between the life worlds. Then, one should ask a question: is this an anthropological category? It could be so, if the "life world" did not need to be described otherwise than the world ascribed to a creature of "lost accommodations". (Blumenberg, 2006, p. 656)

In this half-ironical answer one can see a description of paradoxical human existence, which is impossible to reveal positively, in terms of biology. This is due to the fact that "lost accommodations" describe the life world as stabilisation of a naturally unstable being through norms and rules of culture. In this way, the human’s negative biological basis does not conflict with the cultural superstructure, it directs to this superstructure, on the contrary, and cannot be clarified without it. Thus, phenomenological anthropology is aimed at revealing this negative structure that consolidates the necessity of culture.

At the start of our account of Blumenberg’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology, we should note the two principal points which are to clarify the sense of spatial phenomenologisation and demonstrate that it is impossible to talk about space without bodily experience. The first point is stated in the title of Blumenberg’s essay itself "Back From the Things. Self-Interpretation: Phenomenology as a Life Form" (Von den Sachen zurück. Selbstaufklärung: Phänomenologie als Lebensform) from the collection of his posthumously published works compiled by Manfred Sommer (Sommer) “To the Things and Back Again” (Zu den Sachen und zurück) (Blumenberg, 2002, p. 63). Here one can see the conceptual importance of this short essay aimed at revealing the reverse side (one can say the dark one, since its relation to mistakes and phobias) of the work by a phenomenologist who is striving to realise Husserl’s motto “To the Things!”, without which one cannot give sense to the phenomenological work. However, from the subtitle one can understand that it is phenomenological anthropology which is to deal with this reverse side. It is "anthropology phobia" (Anthropologie-Phobie) that is chosen by Blumenberg to name the central problem of Husserl’s phenomenology (Blumenberg, 2002, p. 98). Thus, the first point is phenomenologisation as anthropologisation.

One can also observe in this way a return from abstract, reduced, idealised, "pure" layers of science to the primary, life world layers of experience. Without the latter, it is impossible to be in touch with a world in the world. And this connection is so complicated that there are no sufficient scientific methods of its revealing. Anthropology could recover the connectivity to the world. Truths, which are given with evidence and serve as guides, oppose various methods of their grasping. Though they are given with evidence and easiness as facticity of our being, they cannot be directly and clearly formulated. Certainly, Husserl’s successors have clearly claimed it in their works, considering phenomenology as a philosophy of origins, which, in their facticity, go before any reflexive work, and without them it is impossible to unwind the thought. Here,
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first of all, we need to refer to Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the above mentioned Blumenberg and many others. Thus, phenomenologisation in this relation is ontologisation of archaeology presented by Foucault as a historical comeback to the discursive archaea (origin) (Revel, 2002, p. 6), or, in other words, archaeology of archaeology. This is the way of reviving the project of existential geology on account of prehistory origination (Prykhodko, 2017, p. 127).

If archaeology is focused on history and is a realisation of a new metaphysics, then existential geology is focused on prehistory and it is a new physics. This physics is based on the body as a complex system of making a relief of a terrain available for cultural existence, with numerous methods, forms and senses.

But what did Blumenberg reveal in Husserl’s diligent work on correcting his own mistakes, in relation to our thesis on continuity of space and body? The subject begins with the problem of verbal expression of empirical data being the most significant in philosophy. It particularly concerns the Husserl’s phenomenological project aimed at antepredicative layers which could reveal the obvious truths of our perception of the world. As mentioned by Husserl, a phenomenologist can give word to the inexpressible, penetrating into the antepredicative experience. He, who confines himself to words (or concepts) and pays no attention to experience, gets into a trap of dogmatic metaphysics. This was again expressed clearly, with phenomenological intention, by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in the preface to "Phenomenology of Perception":

Separated essences are the essences of language. This is a function of a language to give existence to essences of separability which, to tell the truth, only seems to be this, since through it essences base themselves upon the antepredicative life of conscience. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 10)

Thus, it becomes clear that it is impossible for true philosophy to avoid language problems. Therefore, it presents various language substitutes of the inexpressible which are close to concepts and even have power over the latter, due to their demonstrating the world intervention in our experience. It is intervention, since we cannot resist life with its unavoidable facticity, with its power of anteriority that sharply impresses the human mind with anxiety and groundlessness of its The Fact That (das Daß). Philosophy is overfull with metaphors and symbols. They are the growing base for philosophical “muscles” of theory. According to Blumenberg (2002), the key philosophical metaphors are absolute, since they are independent of time. For instance, a flow metaphor which can easily unite Heraclites and Husserl. (Therefore, one of the most promising Blumenberg’s (1998) philosophical projects became known as "metaphorology".

Coming back to Blumenberg’s essay, we can trace with more attention Husserl’s facing the language problem. We can trace the way he, dipping again into the inexpressible of the antepredicative, gradually changes not only terminology but brings to the surface new themes of phenomenology studies. Megasignificant for our research is a space and body story. Blumenberg clings straightaway to one of the most important terms of Husserl and phenomenology as a whole. He also clings to evidence (Evidenz) and its numerous derivatives which are to demonstrate true results of phenomenology work based on contemplation (Anschauung), perception of essences (Wesenschau). The contemplation result is to be obvious, it does not have to leave something behind, otherwise it would contradict the phenomenological demand of demonstrating something exhaustively as a phenomenon, as such that presents itself and gives itself. But what is

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evidence? Any thought of evidence is based on the concept of an optimal position, a line of sight which we observe things from. To find an optimum means not to make mistakes as to a thing, to see it fully and comprehensively. Thus, the image of a thing is to be immobilised, to be its everlasting idea and its essence. But this is not all. According to the so-called "Lecture on Things" ("Ding"-Vorlesung) of the year 1907, there should be also demonstrated the "perception of immanent transcendence", as precisely by Blumeneberg (2002) "The immanence of conscience had to contain all that transcendence of conscience could be able to fulfil and take" (p. 71).

Otherwise speaking, such absorption of transcendence by immanence could provide for a true and complete result. Husserl is known to have established a difference between the immanent (such that puts itself (selbststellende), that gives itself (selbstgebende)) and the transcendent (such that depicts and arranges itself (darstellende), such that gives (gebende)) perception based on complete and incomplete results. Transcendent perception always presents everything in the row of shades, in a continuous line of facticity. It is steeped in particularity, and integrity is available in immanence only.

However, things perceived both in direct contemplation and at an optimum distance of a certain position claiming for clarity (Deutlichkeit), will still remain particular: the attention of contemplation is affected by previously received contemplation. This process reminds Blumenberg of a cartographer’s selecting the scale needed or a microscope’s optical magnification. A physical body breaks up into aspect views, or shades, where one side needs another one, the side available needs a reverse one, etc. Adequate perception does not guarantee self-givenness and completeness. And incompleteness, plurality and particularity are not drawbacks but a condition without which no essence can be thought of. Why so? For this reason the world of things opens up in its transcendence and differences. Transcendence in immanence appears through understanding of any entity’s relativeness, since this entity has an opportunity of another entity for still another one (Blumenberg, 2002, p. 72).

So, transcendence in immanence becomes a productive paradox resulting in shifts in understanding of perception: a clear optimum distance can be the result of momentary fixation of contemplation (which could resemble the metaphysical contemplation of essences), since clarity itself has no power criteria and can be imagined only in relation to its distortion, to its obscurity of various degrees. Such going beyond the limits (that is criteria) can be observed in dynamics of approximation and distancing (Blumenberg, 2002, p. 74).

Approximation is mentioned by Blumenberg (2002) with reference to Husserl "It will not actually happen. But principally it is imaginable" (p. 74).

Thus, we cannot really experience approximation, since there can be no convergence of optics and haptics. In real life there is either this, or that, tertium non datur. Stepping over the optimum distance in approximation, we are just "knocking our head against the thing", receiving maximum reality but nothing for visualisation of phenomenal order.

But, on the other hand, following the optics and haptics divergence, a thing being distanced, loses its clarity in a continuous descent to obscurity, gradually disappearing. Surely, it can be brought back to memory, but there is growing certainty of not meeting it again. Consequently, there is lost a "marginal value of generally possible transcendence in immanence" (der Grenzwert der in Immanenz überhaupt möglichen Transzendenz) (Blumenberg, 2002, p. 74). If the approximation side has a real bumping boundary, then what is to be done with distancing, since unclarity is infinite in its formation? What does this infinity mean for a thing getting farther? Blumenberg states straight away that this is indisputably not the endless distance to an object, but a boundary beyond which further modification of this object is impossible. This is a zero boundary which, as mentioned by Husserl, is to be kinaesthetically conformed to infinity.
Thus, at distance, one can speak about experience of an infinitely remote object, where infinity is a sphere of emotional experiences. This sphere involves remembering (*Erinnerung*), that is trying, through imprinting, to keep the distance, without which there is indifference and loss, and hoping for return (*Erwartung*) which is based on "residual intention" (*Restintention*) aimed at this infinitely distanced object, since it contains sensor remnants referring to the subject history. Moreover, the residual intention has knowledge that no thing can fall out of the world (Blumenberg, 2002, p.76).

Blumenberg further states that it is this phenomenon of infinitely distanced perception objects which is the constituent base for space and its absolute conception, as expressed by Husserl. The most complicated thing here is that it is necessary to experience space for it to become an object of phenomenological research. Space cannot be simply supposed to be ready, inborn (as mentioned by Blumenberg (2002), "by the type of inborn concept" (*auf eine Art von eingeborenem Begriff*) (p. 77), as stated by Immanuel Kant. Though totality cannot be presented (vorstellt), but it can be depicted and arranged (darstellt). With Husserl, there is to be a found "experience" (*Erlebnis*). It is the zero boundary which is to linearly express an empty space in a number of points, similarly to *Abschattungen* of a physical body, in an arrangement which, on the one hand, destroys sensivity and, on the other hand, opens a total possibility of emotional experiences in any direction from the Ego-centre which has emotional experience (Blumenberg, 2002, p. 77).

But there arises a problem: empty space is an abstract concept, a fact which is impossible for emotional experience. Experiences are related to space which empties itself. "Empty space could be a result of the considered total outcome of all emptyings of the space of experiences" (Blumenberg, 2002, p. 78).

Thus, we can see that the abstract empty space finds its base in the space of experiences, but not visa versa, to which it would be urged by apriori forms understood mathematically. But there is another thing: experiences do not mean anything real. Disappearance in distance of objects or things does not mean their real vanishing. If things even disappear, they do this behind other things or beyond our planet’s horizon.

Blumenberg states the following:

An experience constitutive for empty space is a lost experience in free variation. It does not occur on the earth surface, it occurs as a relation of a living body and thing in space, as a relative movement of both in reference to each other. It is subjectively experienced as distancing and disappearing of a thing. (Blumenberg, 2002, p. 78)

Thus, approximation and distancing are the modi of distance which is the result of experiencing the interaction of things and body. The body is invisibly present in a look as its carrier.

This essay deals with differentiating active and passive movements in places, more precisely, with a phenomenon of a relocation facility.

Husserl described it as the only relocation means which we cannot leave,
which can neither be captured nor left. For the subject, a living body
is a zero point of all orientations, everything moves relatively it.
(Blumenberg, 2002, p. 84)

This is the phenomenon of *Vehikel*, a transport arising as a certain paradox of a blind spot in con-
templation, without which nothing can be seen properly. For Husserl it meant that here is the limit
of visibility and thus the limit of evidence, and with evidence one can not speak of transporting the
view to things. The space for contemplation of things, the subject field, is based on the ground of
a body and the Earth as a body of all bodies. They are the transport that forms the experience space,
approximation and distancing, emptying and filling. As to this, Blumenberg wrote that the body, as
well as the Earth, appears in Husserl’s works as a metaphor, but not as a phenomenon, since they
cannot be contemplated, they are on the verge of their ability to contemplate. And vice versa, they
express the boundaries *Anschauung*, contemplation, and its conditions. Blumenberg emphasized:

The earth ground and the living body are elementary vehicles on the
boundary of contemplation inability. Their belonging to the life world is the
base for their disposition as absolute metaphors. Groundlessness is an ex-
tremity of what is thought to be useless for the essence of case, and embod-
iment is the extremity of what can possess it in thickness and faultlessness
of its presence. (Blumenberg, 2002, p. 86)

Summing up, there is a certain sequence of important steps in Blumenberg’s critical analysis that
draw up an abstract scientific curtain of understanding space in Husserl’s works: from abstract
mathematical assumption of empty space to bodily experience of emptying, what, on its boundary,
gives an absolute metaphor for further mathematical and generally scientific perception of the
world. The body as a centre of an orientation system, a zero point, is not simply a physical body
(Körper), but a life world, a living body (Leib). So, here the scientific is adjacent to the philosopi-
ical and unites with it. Embodiment thus includes the Earth as well, since it is the empirical "body of
all bodies", which organises our cognitive relation to the world as a whole. In this way Husserl dis-
covers existential cosmology, since the Earth is an embodiment of intersubjectivity and the orienta-
tion centre in the Universe. So, it can be seen that the return of space to the limits of bodily experi-
ence expresses the same cosmology processes, where one can observe a transition from purely
physical and mathematical conception of the Universe to more balanced interdisciplinary approa-
ches (Bazaluk, 2015, p. 11; Bazaluk, 2015, p. 25) and reinstatement of philosophical cosmology. For
instance, one can mention the development of a concept of "ontological framework" by Ber-
nardo Kastrup (2017) to overcome philosophical doubts as to multidirectional and multiform
cosmological knowledge. Other examples are a philosophical plunging into the concept of multiversum developed by Ward Blondé (2016), historical and philosophical analysis of such a
process that reveals the plurality of cosmology subjects (Rudenko, Sobol’sievskyi, & Tytarenko,
2018, p. 128) and diversity of philosophical cosmologies (Aliaiev, & Kutsepal, 2018, p. 154).
Scientific novelty

The authors of the article have emphasized the productive role of space theme anthropologisation in the context of modern performative turn. Such anthropologisation is impossible without using the results of the previous phenomenology research and its critical analysis. This was demonstrated on the example of philosophical reflection of Hans Blumenberg concerning Husserl’s phenomenology and revealing its hidden "anthropology phobia". Moreover, anthropologisation is marked by bringing back to the philosophical discourse of the embodiment theme which at the same time saves from excessive abstraction of human problems. It is also characterised by having found a new empirical ground for philosophical anthropology itself. In addition, this paper does not display an abstract phenomenology conception as a theoretical construct, but phenomenology activity, practical work on expressing the antepredicative experience and solving the problems arising in this complicated process. Applying the Blumenberg’s analysis also allows to peep in the sideline notes of Edmund Husserl himself, which for their part acquire special meaning in relation to such a practical (performative) turn.

Conclusions

It becomes possible to answer the question of the reasons for the shift from spatiality to performativity after the demonstrated Blumenberg’s analysis of Husserl’s phenomenological work. The answer is as follows:

1) absolutisation of space without mentioning its relation to body experience is doomed to metaphysical abstraction, which means being up in the emptiness (a vivid example of what, as mentioned by Blumenberg, is Husserl’s "anthropology phobia") – to being unreasonable and groundless, since

2) the ground is metaphorically expressed by an anthropology basis. This is why anthropology, through thematic fronting of embodiment, can reveal the structural conditions for perception, though

3) this requires the anthropology having compensational features, to avoid false culture and nature dualism.

Summing up the three conclusions above, it should be noted that:

4) the space and body relationship is expressed by the Vehikel-phenomenon (the transport phenomenon) of the body itself, which metaphorically marks the boundary of contemplation: the body as a transport facility deals with transferring – placing as well as arranging and depicting, Darstellung, which replaces something missing and unavailable for direct contemplation, revealing the spatial infrastructure for object perception and creating the conditions of presence; and

5) Darstellung, a depicting arrangement, is at the same time a bodily performance, since one of the word meanings clearly points to a play, staging and performing, which gives an aesthetic, poetic and emphatic impact on the use of language, in our case, on the speech acts of a phenomenology philosopher.

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АКТУАЛЬНІ ПИТАННЯ ФІЛОСОФСЬКОЇ АНТРОПОЛОГІЇ

СТОСУНОК МІЖ ТІЛОМ І ПРОСТОРОМ У ДОСЛІДНИЦЬКОМУ ПОЛІ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГІЧНОЇ АНТРОПОЛОГІЇ: БЛЮМЕНБЕРГОВА КРИТИКА "АНТРОПОЛОГІЄФОБІЇ" ЕДМУНДА ГУСЕРЛЯ

Мета. Запропонована на розгляд стаття спрямована на прояснення зсуви в гуманітарному пізнанні від тематики просторового повороту, оголошеного Мішелям Фуко, до перформативного повороту, що має антропологічні засади і грунтується на всебічному дослідженні головної ролі тіла для культурного існування, як наслідку зворотної реакції на штучну теоретичну деформацію між простором і тілом, що полягає переважно в ігноруванні теми тілесності, якраз прикладом такої теоретичної деформації була "антропологієфобія" Едмунда Гусерля, яку викриває і докладно аналізує в своїй критиці Ганс Блюменберг.

Наукова новизна здійсненого у цьому дослідженні підходу полягає передусім у показі не абстрактної феноменологічної концепції як теоретичного інструмента, а самої феноменологічної діяльності, практичної роботи з виразення допредикативного опікуння і по теоретического конструкта, а самой феноменологической деятельности, практической работы по

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ОТНОШЕНИЕ МЕЖДУ ТЕЛОМ И ПРОСТРАНСТВОМ В ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКОМ ПОЛЕ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКОЙ АНТРОПОЛОГИИ: БЛЮМЕНБЕРГРАВСКАЯ КРИТИКА "АНТРОПОЛОГИЕФОБИИ" ЭДМУНДА ГУСЕРЛЯ

ОТНОШЕНИЕ МЕЖДУ ТЕЛОМ И ПРОСТРАНСТВОМ В ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКОМ ПОЛЕ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКОЙ АНТРОПОЛОГИИ: БЛЮМЕНБЕРГАВСКАЯ КРИТИКА "АНТРОПОЛОГИЕФОБИИ" ЭДМУНДА ГУСЕРЛЯ

Цель. Предложенная статья проясняет смещение в гуманитарном познании от тематики пространственного поворота, провозглашенного Мишелям Фуко, к перформативному повороту, который имеет антропологические принципы и основывается на всестороннем исследовании ведущей роли тела для культурного существования, как следствия обратной реакции на искусственность концептуального разрыва между пространством и телом, суть которого в игнорировании темы телесности. Примером такой теоретической деформации была "антропологиейфобия" Эдмунда Гусерля, которую открывает и подробно анализирует в своей критике Ганс Блюменберг. Научная новизна реализованного в этом исследовании подхода является прежде всего в демонстрации не абстрактной феноменологической концепции как теоретического конструкта, а самой феноменологической деятельности, практической работы по выражению допредикативного опыта и по решению пробем и ошибок, возникающих в ходе этого сложного
процеса. Привлечение блюменберговского анализа позволяет заглянуть в заметки на полях самого Эдмунда Гуссерля, которые со своей стороны получают особенное значение в связи с таким практическим (перформативным) поворотом. **Выводы** демонстрируют следующее положение дел, которое показывает антропологически-перформативный сдвиг к проблематике тела: 1) абсолютизация пространства без указания на его связь с телесным опытном является необоснованной и безосновательной подобно гуссерлевской "антропологиефобии"; 2) поскольку сама основа есть метафорически выраженный антропологический фундамент, то антропология благодаря тематизации телесности может раскрыть структурные условия познания; 3) это наделяет антропологию компенсаторным характером, чтобы обойти ложный дуализм культуры и природы; 4) таким образом связь между пространством и телом выражает *Vehikel*-феномен (феномен транспортного средства) самого тела, размещая, расставляя и изображая, таким способом замещая нечто отсутствующее и недоступное для непосредственного прямого созерцания, раскрывая пространственную инфраструктуру восприятия предмета, создавая условия присутствия, а также метафорически обозначая границу созерцания; 5) изображение-расстановка (*Darstellung*) является одновременно телесным перформансом, представлением, инсценировкой и исполнением, что эстетически, поэтически и эмфатически всегда отражается на использовании философского языка, в нашем случае на способе работы с языком философа-феноменолога.

**Ключевые слова:** перформативный поворот; тело; пространство; феномен транспортного средства; Гуссерль; Блюменберг; феноменологическая антропология; антропологиефобия

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